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ABSTRACT
The theoretical foundation for the present investi­
gation is the contention that there are three main areas of 
consideration regarding the judgmental process. These are: 
(1) stimulus variables, or the nature of the input; (2) out­
put or response'variables: and (3) mediational variables. or 
characteristics of the judge. Lewin's topology is used to 
view Dogmatism as a measure of the cognitive medium through 
which information is processed. The observation from his 
field theory that the most important feature of the medium 
is the fluidity-rigidity dimension is considered pertinent.
A fluid medium is defined as one that responds quickly to 
any influence that is brought to bear on it, i.e., is 
flexible and pliant. By contrast, a rigid medium resists 
change, i.e., is inelastic and stiff. According to this 
view, the cognitive structure of High Dogmatic judges would 
be rigid and less permeable, while the cognitive structure 
of Low Dogmatic judges would be fluid and highly permeable.
I
Medium Dogmatics would fall midway between on the fluidity- 
rigidity dimension; hence, their cognitive boundaries would 
be selectively permeable. The results indicated that 
Medium Dogmatic judges were indeed more accurate in their 
judgments on a selected prediction task than Low Dogmatic
viii
judges. Medium Dogmatic judges did not differ from High 
Dogmatic judges; however, it should be noted that High Dog­
matic judges consistently performed in the direction of 
decreased accuracy. The data partially supported the rele­
vance of Dogmatism as a mediational construct varying along 
Lewin's fluidity-rigidity dimension. It was argued that 
Dogmatism could be used as a measure of the relative fluid­
ity or rigidity of the cognitive structure. Medium Dog­
matic judges were viewed as having selectively permeable 
cognitive systems which allowed them to selectively weigh 
incoming information. Low Dogmatic judges were seen as 
having highly permeable systems considerably more ppen to 
incoming information, while High Dogmatic judges had rigid 
and inaccessible cognitive systems. Other measures of
I i
cognitive style, such as Confidence, Appropriateness of 
Confidence, and Accuracy, were discussed in their relation-
l
ship to the basic input-mediation-output paradigm.
CHAPTER I
PROSPECTIVE
It could be said that one of man's protective and 
adaptive mechanisms is his ability to act upon intuition, 
to make calculated guesses, and to make predictions about 
future events. It will be the premise of this study that 
each person possesses this skill to some degree and uses it 
in a variety of situations. That individuals differ in the 
capacity for judgmental accuracy is reflected throughout our 
culture— in the vicissitudes of the stock market, bridge 
table, and marriage bed. In these unspecialized uses it 
goes under the rubric hunch, intuition (Guiora et al.,
1965), or guessing (Dailey, 1966). Yet when the ability 
to predict outcomes is used by a professional identified 
by a clinical relationship to clients or patients, it is 
considered unscientific to refer to hunches, guesses, or 
intuition. More acceptable to the scientific and profes­
sional community is the term diagnosis, and in more special­
ized cases, clinical prediction. Guiora (1965, p. 779) 
pointed out that to use these words or their variants is a 
"true reflection of our ignorance of what transpires be­
tween information input and information output.” Hunt and 
Jones (1962) argued that there: remains even today some 
adherence to the mystical and a rejection of the empirical
as it relates to the judgmental process and the decision­
maker. To be sure, the study of decision-making is 
fraught with peril (Hunt and Jones, 1962), especially when 
the researcher is the clinical psychologist himself.
In order to study the decision-making process in 
the clinical psychologist, many researchers have evoked 
clinical analogues or used "naive” clinicians. At this 
point, an exploration of the rationale underlying the use 
of "naive" clinicians is in order. Sechrest et al., (1967) 
argued that the research consumer is aware of the differences 
between "naive" judges and experienced judges, while Cline 
and Richards (1962) maintained that these differences may 
not be as large as one is led to believe. In addition, 
the scientific reader is asked to conclude that students 
in introductory psychology are representative of practicing 
clinicians or beginning psychology students. However, as 
Little (1967) has shown, probably "no more than 1% of that 
undergraduate population would pass the screening process 
used by graduate programs in clinical psychology. On the 
basis of intellectual ability and motivation alone (both 
significantly related to learning), they should be ruled out 
(p. 17)." With the foregoing as an example of this investi­
gator's bias, the present study will review research which 
endeavors to deduce "truths" about the clinical process,
using strategies which may not be adequate to the task.
Early Beginnings
Early philosophers like Spinoza, Bergson, and the As 
sociationists were all interested in how man arrived at 
general conclusions about—his world. They called conclu­
sions based on what appeared to be minimal information 
"intuition,” "inference" or "empathy" (Wild, 1938). Al­
though they differed in fundamental terminology, these 
writers held in common the belief that accuracy was the 
basic ingredient (Guiora et al., 1965) common to all con­
ceptualizations of the judgmental process..
Early astronomers used observation as a means of de 
veloping laws that would lead to prediction. The earliest 
extant record showing that variables in the judgmental 
situation affected the prediction process comes from 
Bessel's observation that Kinnebrook was making judgments 
which varied by a few seconds from those made by his 
superior (Boring, 1950). This early observation set the 
stage for the development of psychophysics, one of the 
early models used to conceptualize the judgmental process 
(Hunt and Jones, 1962). Hunt and Jones' (1962) early work 
led them to the conclusion "that clinical judgment is a 
researchable phenomenon (p. 32), and is related to other 
known phenomena studied in the psychological laboratory.
Hunt (1951, 1957) rejected the nonanalytic approach to the 
study of the judgment process and maintained that the 
"clinician of today is on firm ground in viewing his judg­
mental process as a natural phenomenon open to all the 
investigative procedures of experimental psychology (Hunt 
and Jones, 1962, p. 28)." Thus* judgment as a general 
capacity should be amenable to experimental investigation. 
Moreover, any investigation of this kind should view the 
judgmental situation as a process of interaction between 
judge and environment.
I '
The position taken by the present investigator is put 
straight-forwardly by Hunt and Jones (1962), who stated that 
"public opinion still distrusts the judgment of man by 
machine or by rote statistical formula and demands that
I
man be judged by man (p. 31)." If useful insights are to 
be gained from a study of the judgmental process, then psy­
chology as a science and profession should concern itself 
with real people dealing with real decisions of life, 
rather than engage in polemics regarding the study of "naive" 
versus "sophisticated" clinicians.
In conclusion, this investigator will contend that 
clinicarl judgment is but a specific instance of a general 
judgmental capacity, and that data generated in the general 
case will have relevance to the specific case.
CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
If one searches for a model to conceptualize the 
judgmental situation, one is faced with several alterna­
tives. For example, Sarbin et al., (1960) proposed a 
cognitive model in which inference is a function of en­
vironmental events, modular structure (analogous to a com­
puter program),1 and response probabilities. Hunt and Jones 
(1962) used a psychophysical model whose major emphasis was 
defining the dimensions of situational and report categories, 
while Miller and Bieri (1963) used an information theory 
model. The theoretical foundation for the present investi­
gation is manifest in the contention that there are three 
main areas of consideration regarding the judgmental process. 
These include (1) stimulus variables, or the nature of the 
input, (2) response or output variables, and (3) mediational 
variables, or characteristics of the judge. In Figure 1 the 
judgmental situation is viewed as transmission of stimulus 
information (Attneave, 1959; G. Miller, 1956; Wiener, 1948; 
Bieri ejb al., 1966). The major interest of this study in­
volves the nature of mediational variables related to the 
judgmental process; however, a review of inputs and outputs 
would seem to be in order, since these have been shown to 
interact with mediational variables.
INPUT —
MEDIATING
STRUCTURE — OUTPUT
CASE JUDGE JUDGMENT
OR OR
STIMULI CLINICIAN PREDICTION
FIGURE I 
INFORMATION THEORY MODEL OF THE 
JUDGMENTAL PROCESS
/
/
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Input Variables
In the clinical situation., anything that can be ob­
served about an individual could be classified as an input 
variable.
Source of Information
Hunt and his collaborators demonstrated that relia­
ble psychiatric diagnosis can be made from a person's 
response to vocabulary and comprehension test items (Hunt 
and Walker, 1962; Hunt et—al., 1966). Other investigations 
of source stimuli have shown that projective techniques, 
when used "blind," increased the reliability of some clini-
I
cal judgments above chance expectations (Albee and Hamlin, 
1950; Allison ejtal., 1964; Bialick and Hamlin, 1954; 
Chambers and Hamlin, 1957; Nadler et al.., 1959; Silverman, 
1959).
Researchers comparing different source stimuli have 
noted that certain kinds of information provide a better 
judgmental base than others. Horowitz (1962) and Soskin
I
(1954) demonstrated that the addition of projective material 
to biographical material did not significantly increase ac­
curacy of judgments made. However, Little and Shneidman
(1955) reported that the TAT and MAPS were equally as use­
ful to the clinicians as the complete clinic folder in
making valid Q sort descriptions. Comparing anamnestic 
data and test data, Little and Shneidman (1959) concluded 
that anamnestic data were superior to test data in aiding 
clinicians to make diagnostic formulations. Lindzey (1965), 
accepting Meehl's (1954) challenge, demonstrated the supe­
riority of the TAT as a source stimuli over formalized 
(actuarial) methods of data combinations. Luft (1951) 
indicated that clinicians who read the source material and 
those who listened to the source material did equally well 
in predicting objective test responses, while those who 
listened were better in predicting the projective test re­
sponses. Similarly, Gunderson (1965) demonstrated greater 
agreement between judges using similar source stimuli (In­
terview) than those using dissimilar (Projective versus 
Interview) source stimuli.
In summary, it appears that categorizing inputs in 
terms of source has not furnished information regarding 
the judgmental situation, nor has it furnished the prac­
ticing clinician with usable generalizations.
Amount of Information
Another variable assumed to affect accuracy is the 
amount of information, regardless of source, available to 
the judge. Kostlan (1954), Sines (1959), and Borke and 
Piske (1957) have shown that accuracy of judgment can be
increased if the amount of information is increased- How­
ever, the problem is not unidimensional, since most of the 
studies reviewed confounded source and amount of information. 
For example, Sines (1959) reported that "the relationship 
between amount of information available to the diagnosti­
cian and the accuracy of his judgments is complex rather 
than linear, and varies according to the particular type (or 
kind) of data made available to the clinician (p. 492)." 
Similarly, Kostlan (1954) showed that increased information 
led to poorer prediction if the Rorschach was used as 
source stimuli (Soskin, 1959); however, increasing amounts 
of source stimuli led to better prediction if the source 
stimuli were anamnestic data (Little and Shneidman, ,1959).
In a study designed to hold source stimuli constant while 
varying amount of Information, Powers and Hamlin (1955) 
demonstrated that either too few or too many Rorschach 
source stimuli decreased reliability and validity of the 
judgments.
Another source of;error in research designed to in-
j '
vestigate amount of information is that of sequence. Post­
man and Page (1947) found that in psychophysical judgments, 
sequence affected subsequent judgments. Similarly, Miller 
and Campbell (1959), in the area of social psychology, have 
demonstrated a recency and primacy effect. In the clinical
10
area, Sines (1959) found a sequence effect in which undue 
weight was given to the earliest material encountered.
Regarding relevance of inputs, Blanchard (1966), 
following Holt (1958), provided some judges with informa­
tion that was highly relevant to the situation to be judged 
and other judges with information of low relevance to the 
judged situation; he concluded that relevance of informa­
tion did affect predictive accuracy. In an attempt to con­
trol both relevance and sequence, Huff (1966) concluded 
that interjudge reliability on personality ratings was 
maximal for those sequences in which the most relevant in­
formation was provided first.
The general belief that the amount of information is 
a linear function, and that the judge does best when he has 
the most information is not supported by research data. 
Barendregt (1961) obtained a curvilinear relationship between 
judgmental validity and additional information. Similarly, 
Cline and Richards (1960), Dymond (1953), Hathaway (1956), 
and Leventhal (1957) pointed out that minimal data consist­
ing of age, sex, and vocation accounted for "nearly all the 
predictive accuracy, and that additional information appeared 
not to enhancel predictions appreciably (J. Weiss, 1963)." It 
has been shown that amount of information is often confounded 
with source, sequence, and relevance of information, (a factor
11
which may account for the low reliability of clinical judg­
ment reported in the scientific literature).
Feedback of Information
Little attention has been given the knowledge-of- 
results question in the clinical judgment literature. 
However, it is generally concluded that feedback resulted 
in better performance (Ammons, 1956; Bilodeau and Bilodeau, 
1961). In a recent investigation Sechrest et al., (1967)
using "naive” clinicians, directly tested the usefulness 
of feedback in a clinical analogue situation. While they 
reported three different experiments designed to investigate 
the effect of feedback and lack of feedback, no clear supe­
riority to feedback was demonstrated (Rotter, 1967).
However, Dailey (1966), in a somewhat less elaborate de­
sign, showed progressive increase in predictive accuracy 
as a function of feedback of information, but since Dailey’s 
study did not use a no-feedback group as a control, this 
conclusion must be regarded as tentative.
Situational Variables
Masling (1960) has shown that a host of variables 
affect the testing situation. Similarly, situational 
variables can and do affect the nature of the judgments 
made. For example, Campbell et al., (1957) have demon­
strated that extreme stimuli introduced into the judgmental
12
process tend to serve as anchors* pushing the decisions of 
some people toward and some away from the anchor values. 
Time also seems to affect the judgmental process. Huff 
and Friedman (1967) reported that clinicians who were given 
unlimited time to make a judgment were considerably less 
reliable than judges who were rushed.
i
CHAPTER III
OUTPUT VARIABLES
Response Categories
The significance of report categories cannot be over­
looked; Holt. (1958), and Lewinsohn et al.., (1963) have argued
i
that if the response mode used is contrived, alien or inap­
propriate to clinician or situation, this can greatly af­
fect the reliability and validity of the judgment being 
measured.
Matching Procedures
Typically in the matching situation, the clinician isi
asked to match input stimuli, consisting of test material or 
biographical data, with other test material. Meehl (1959a) 
argued that this procedure does not appear to answer the 
complicated questions of validity and accuracy of judgment; 
yet there seems to be evidence that this response mode can 
be a useful tool in assessing clinical accuracy (Estees,
1938; Taft, 1955). For example, Troop (1938) demonstrated 
that clinicians could match Rorschach records quite re­
liably. Krugman (1943) reported that this method indicated 
high validity between judges matching different interpreta­
tions of the same Rorschach. Similarly, Holsopple and 
Phelan (1954) demonstrated that clinicians were able to sort
14
biographies correctly with various tests, including the 
Rorschach, with a high degree of accuracy. In a recent 
investigation of the matching technique, Phelan (1964)
demonstrated that there were individual differences in the
11
clinicians' ability to carry out the task. More important, 
however, was the observation that this type of response 
mode favored the matching of projective material with biog­
raphies over projective and objective material. The re­
lationship between input stimuli and response modes cannot 
be emphasized enough. If the judge is not familiar with 
the situation to be judged (Holt, 1958) and the response 
mode has inherent limitations (Lowinsohn el: aj.., 1963), 
the results will be a reduction in judgmental accuracy.
The matching procedure thus appears to be a widely 
used response mode which has demonstrated significantly 
high validity coefficients when used to validate certain 
types of input data. Nevertheless, the method is not with­
out critics. Croriback (1949) was one, as was Taft (1955), 
who stated, "the matching method has the great advantage 
over (other) methods of studying the ability to judge 
others in that its criterion is completely objective, but 
has the weakness that it constitutes an artificial situa­
tion not paralleled in everyday life or in psychological
— II
practice (p. 2).
i
v
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Psychiatric Diagnosis
In the definitive work in the area, Ash (1949) 
demonstrated that traditional nosological categories tended 
to be unreliable. Approaching the problem in a somewhat 
different manner, Schmidt and Fonda (1956) reported that 
agreement between judges was 80% for major categories such 
as organic, psychotic, or characterological; but when sub- 
types within these categories were used, the reliability 
dropped to 50% agreement. The general conclusion from 
studies of this type (Hunt et al.., 1953; Grayson and Tol- 
man, 1950) was that as diagnostic judgments became more 
specific, agreement between judges tended to drop.
Q Sort Methodology
Block (1961) offered the Q method as a research 
technique and response mode that is responsive to the ideo­
graphic approach used in most clinical evaluations, but is 
also by its nature amenable to vigorous statistical manipu­
lation (see Stephenson, 1953). While the review presented 
here is not exhaustive, it is possible to make the following 
general statement: when this method is used as the re­
sponse mode there seems to be the highest interjudge relia­
bility— indicating that this procedure shows the clinician 
in the best light (Wright et al., 1963; Block, 1961; Rubin 
and Shontz, 1960; Downing and Rickies, 1965). Similarly,
i
Meehl (1959a) sees real advantages for furthering clinical 
science in the use of the Q method. Phillips et al., (1965) 
caution that the "Q sort has proceeded from a statistical
l
procedure of factor analysis which was used in type psy­
chology research as a measurement tool for individual and 
experimental evaluation . . .  without sufficient systematic 
investigation of the instrument and of the logical founda­
tions and implications of the technique (p. 422).n Even 
with this caution in mind, the Q method seems to be a 
generally overlooked clinical research tool of high relia­
bility and validity when used in typical clinical judgment 
research.
Clinical Analogue
The judge is given some information about an individ­
ual, usually test material or life history data; using the 
test or life history material the judge is required to 
predict the subject's response to a specific test or to 
predict events in the subject's life (Taft, 1955). The 
clinical analogue has the special advantage of "simulating 
the gradual buildup of information as a psychologist works 
his way through a typical case (Oskamp, 1965, p. 261; 
McArthur, 1954)." In general, the tests were constructed 
with data supplied from real subjects recruited for the 
purpose (Soskin, 1954; Weiss, 1963) . Although this
V, 17
technique has not been widely used, it seems to incorporate 
those qualities which most nearly approximate the judgmental 
situation itself. In reviewing the clinical judgmental 
situation, Dailey (1960) concluded that three types of 
biases (pathological, abstract, and testing) typically 
creep into the judgmental situation. The pathological bias 
is the "tendency to see symptoms and defense mechanisms in 
everyone (p. 20).” The abstract bias "involves the belief 
that personality is an abstract thing existing on the other 
side of behaviors.. (Which)... is regarded as a mere screen 
or defense which distorts the real meaning." This belief, 
Dailey maintained, diminishes the psychologist's ability 
to be a good observer because he tends to "devalue the 
importance of simple behavior observations (p. 20)."
Dailey viewed the testing bias as an over-dependence ex­
hibited by many clinical psychologists on standardized 
observation and "measurement as the basis of assessment 
(p. 21)." Dailey wondered if "we are losing the capacity 
to perceive with the naked eye, because of excessive de- 
pendence on tests." He maintained that these biases "are 
widespread in modern psychology; that they hamper assess­
ment; and that there will be no significant improvement in 
assessment until orientation and methods are devised which 
free us from the ill effects of these preoccupations
t
\18
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(Dailey, 1960, p. 21)." The methods and orientations he 
proposed^were the Programmed;Case Laboratory (Dailey, 1966). 
These are series of events from the lives of fatoous people 
arranged in a sequence (more will be said about this method 
in another section). It serves as an appropriate response 
mode because the material is of a nontest nature (obviating 
the test bias); it is about apparently normal people (deal­
ing with the pathological bias), and lastly, since it is 
the intention of this researcher to investigate judgment 
as a general phenomenon, general rather than specific 
material was desirable. However, it is important to note 
that several studies (Kostlan, 1954; Holsopple and Phelan, 
1954; Phelan, 1965) found that clinical judges had greater 
predictive accuracy when they used life history material 
(see Little and Shneidman, 1959).
I
CHAPTER IV
MEDIATIONAL VARIABLES
The conclusions arrived at in Chapter III emphasize 
the relationship between input and output variables. How­
ever, these variables do not operate independently of each 
other, or without reference to the judge himself. Stager 
(1967) has pointed out, "There is a definite interaction 
effect between personality and situational variables (p. 
152);” however, rather than discuss personality theory, a 
more general approach will be taken and the judge will be 
viewed as a processor or mediator of information. With 
this orientation it is possible to investigate the nature 
of the medium through which information is processed as 
it is transferred from input to output status. Traditional 
research strategies have attempted to conceptualize the 
"good" versus the "bad" judge (Taft, 1956; Phelan, 1964; 
Allport, 1961; Allison et al., 1964); the present study
i
will focus attention on the characteristic of the judge as 
a mediator of information. Recently, investigators such 
as Bieri (1953, 1962) have focused their attention on cog­
nitive style as a general phenomenon affecting decision­
making accuracy. Cognitive style is defined as a general 
organizing capacity of the individual which affects the
arrangement, categorization and flexibility of information 
inputs. It may be seen as an enduring and central capac­
ity of the individual, which in itself exercises restraint 
and interacts with situational variables. Similarly, 
Broverman (1964) maintained that "cognitive styles are 
second-order individual differences, or individual differ­
ences based upon different relationships between functions 
within individuals; as opposed to first-order individual 
differences which are based on normative differences be­
tween individuals, within the species (p. 487)." The 
intention here is not to argue the specificity of cognitive 
styles, but to point out that they seem to be a more general 
and productive means of assessing individual differences 
than are specific personality traits.
Confidence as a Cognitive Style
Coue is said to have instructed each patient to face 
himself in the mirror and say that "every day and in every 
way I am getting better and better." Articles in magazines
and newspapers give us advice on how to be more confident,
\
and at least one national organization advertises, "it makes 
you more confident and teaches you how to win friends and 
influence people." Norman V. Peale's recent book, The 
Power' of Positive Thinking, is another example of the 
general belief that all people need is confidence in
themselves or others to be better, more popular, or even 
more accurate in judging others. The implication for the 
judgmental process is clear: are people who are highly confi 
dent in their judgment more accurate? Apostolakos (1957) 
found a correlation of + .62 between accuracy of judgment
and confidence. Weinstein and Johnson (1963) found that
\
"when judgments were considered according to the degree of 
confidence expressed by the judges, no consistent relation­
ships were obtained. The judgments which were rated 'very 
certain' were actually poorer than those judged 'moderately 
certain' or neither certain nor uncertain. Those judged 
'very uncertain1 were in all groups somewhat more accurate 
than those judged 'moderately uncertain' and in two; of the 
groups more accurate even than those judged 'very certain’." 
Watley' (1966a) also points out that counselors who typically 
lacked confidence in their freshman GPA predictions were 
more often correct than counselors who typically expressed 
the most confidence in their judgments. In fact, ^ "counse­
lors who were— most, moderate [sic] or least confident 
about the accuracy of tl^ eir predictions obtained relative 
hit accuracies (means) that fell in the reverse order." 
Oskamp (1965), investigating the relationship of amounts of 
information, confidence, and accuracy, found that as more 
information was fed to the clinician, his confidence "soar­
ed, " until at the end of the information gathering process.
"certainty about their own decisions became out of propor­
tion to the actual correctness of these decisions (p. 264)."
From the foregoing analysis it is evident that there is 
some generality in statements about confidence. Similarly,
Meehl (1954,, 1957) agrees there is some justification for
I
studying this phenomenon as a possible predictor variable.
Other investigators have studied the correlates of 
confidence as a cognitive style; Little (1961) maintained that
i
confidence is a stable personality trait; Forer and Tolman (1952) 
concluded that "general confidence or certainty of a clini­
cian appears to have some consistency or stability in which 
clinical judgment is required." If, as Little and Forer 
maintain, confidence is both a stable personality charac­
teristic and refractory to changes in the judgmental situa­
tion, it would be interesting to know how high and low 
confidence responders differ.' Although Watley (1966) found 
no difference between high and low confidence responders on 
any of the scales of EPPS or the MMPI, however, he did find 
that "counselors who expressed least confidence in their 
judgments had a significantly higher mean (p ^'.02) on the 
MAT than the mean for the most confident counselors (p. 66)."
On the other hand, Block and Pettersen (1955), using the Q 
method, found reliable differences between high and low 
confidence responders. Lastly, Kogan and Wallach (1960)
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hinted that there might be a relationship between "attitudes 
toward risk . . . (and) judgment certainty."
A review of the available literature demonstrated the 
relevance of confidence as a cognitive style; yet the vari­
ety of methods employed to measure confidence place in jeop­
ardy any concrete statement regarding its relationship to 
accuracy. For example, Weinstein and Johnson (1963), em­
ployed a five-point scale ranging from (1) very uncertain to 
(5) very certain; Watley (1966) used a nine-point scale that 
ranged from very confident to not at all confident. Forer 
and Tolman (1952) gave their subjects a three-point scale 
that included the items (1) definitely uncertain, (2) rea­
sonably certain* and (3) very certain. Little (1961) re­
sorted to a four-point ordinal scale. Oskamp (1962, 1965) 
turned to a ratio scale patterned after a scaling technique 
developed by Adams (1957), which considers Johnson's (1955) 
observation that as heterogeneity of stimulus material 
increases, the relationship between confidence and "accuracy 
may drop to zero (Oskamp, 1962)." Finally, Little (1961) 
argued that there might be more than one kind of confidence; 
he distinguished between "generalized confidence" and "individ­
ual certainty-uncertainty." He would reserve the term
I ;
confidence "to describe the average of confidence statements 
over a series of judgments and certainty to refer to the
deviation of an individual confidence estimate from a sub­
ject1 s own mean (p. 100)." While it is debatable that two 
such entities exist, it is possible to evaluate two levels 
of confidence, moment-to-moment or decision-to-decision 
confidence, and the appropriateness of such confidence 
(Adams, 1957; Oskamp, 1962).
i
i In summarizing the foregoing studies, it seems ap­
parent that confidence is a cognitive style worthy of in­
vestigation. However, it should be measured, taking into 
account various definitions of confidence, and taking care 
to standardize methods of measurement.
Dogmatism as a Cognitive Style
Rokeach (1960) pointed out that dogmatism rendered 
the individual relatively refractory to change. From this 
simple pronouncement, a number of studies dealing with the 
problem-solving and perceptual abilities of high and low 
dogmatics have appeared in the scientific literature 
(Restle et al., 1964; Zagona and Zurcher, 1965; Ehrlich, 
1961; White and Alter, 1965). Several studies generally 
sustained the conclusion that individuals who were highly 
dogmatic tended to be relatively more resistant to incoming 
information than were their less dogmatic counterparts 
(Harvey, 1963; Harvey and Caldwell, 1959; Milldn,.1957; 
Ohnmacht, 1966). These studies also lend credence to
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Rokeach's (I960) suggestion that a person's cognitive 
system is relatively open or closed "to the extent to which 
the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant in­
formation received from the outside on its own intrinsic 
merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation 
arising from within the person or from outside (p. 57)."
It is noted that a mediational view of dogmatism could 
yield many useful conclusions about the judgmental situa-
I
tion; yet an intensive review of the available literature 
did not yield a study in which the predictive accuracy of 
clinical judgment was related to dogmatism. However, view­
ing the judgmental process as :&n input-output'system and using 
dogmatism as a description of the degree of openness of the 
mediational system,the following questions were produced:
I i
(1) Do situational variables such as amount of informa­
tion interact with measures of dogmatism?
(2) Does feedback of information interact with dogma­
tism?
(3) Is the relative openness or closedness of the 
system related to accuracy?
(4) Are other measures of cognitive style related to 
dogmatism?
Experience as a. Mediational Variable
At this point, a return to the question raised in
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the early sections of the present study is pertinent; that 
is, is there a difference between "naive" psychology stu­
dents and seasoned clinicians? The general conclusion 
supported by a large number of studies is that assessment
I
validity did not increase with increasing experience in the
i
field of psychology (Gerbstein, 1963; Goldberg, 1959; 
Horowitz, 1962; Hunt, et al., 1957; Watley, 1966b). There 
was, however, an increase in reliability (Bendig and ' 
Spraque, 1954; Grigg, 1958). The point at issue is not 
whether secretaries or regression equations are more accurate 
than seasoned clinicians, but rather what cognitive processes 
distinguish the accurate judge from his less accurate col­
league (Allison, 1964).
l
!
CHAPTER V
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This section will attempt to synthesize certain con­
cepts and premises raised in other sections of this paper.
The first premise is that there is no diagnostic or clini­
cal decision-making skill per se; these are only words de­
scribing technical skills that overlie a general capacity.
It is further assumed that this capacity is the general 
base from which all decisions are made; thus* there are no 
skills defining the clinical situation alone. Rather* there 
is a general ability which is honed sharp by clinical tech­
nology. In other words* the budding clinician and diagnosti­
cian bring to the decision situation skills and abilities 
already formed; what training offers is technical advances. 
Therefore, those processes that define the decision or 
judgmental task are conceived as fundamental to all types 
of decision-making* and concepts or processes generated in 
one situation should be applicable in another. The exact 
parameters of this capacity await investigation. However*
I
there is evidence that certain input variables interact 
with this capacity to enhance judgmental accuracy. The 
intent of 'the present study will be to select a class of 
input variables and vary them systematically.
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The second premise is that information theory offers 
the most productive model with which to investigate the 
judgmental process. This model focuses attention on the 
nature of input and output variables in relationship to the 
judge as mediator. Too little attention has been placed on 
the judge himself. There are studies that endeavor to 
generalize traits or personality characteristics of the 
"good" versus the "bad" judge., but the definition of traits 
or the description of personality types has proven inade­
quate in several areas (Kelly and Fisk., 1951) . The present 
study will focus on the judge as mediator and will explore 
certain characteristics of the judge through the medium of 
cognitive theory. It will attempt to bring together two 
models, the information theory model of Bieri et_ al., (1966) 
and the cognitive model of Rokeach (1960). In this manner 
the judge is viewed as a processor of information whose 
decisions are governed, to a certain degree, by the nature 
of the inputs, the judge's cognitive style, and the capacity 
of the response mode to carry the output.
Input Variables
Input variables to be studied in this investigation 
will be: (1) amount of information provided the judge and
(2) the relation between feedback-of-information and no- 
feedback-of-information. The following hypotheses are 
raised:
29
(1) Does judgmental accuracy vary as a function of 
amount of information?
(2) Does judgmental accuracy vary as a function of feed­
back versus no-feedback?
(3) Does amount of information interact with the feed-
v
back-no-feedback dimension?
Mediational Variables
Cognitive variables to be explored will be: dogma­
tism, confidence, and appropriateness of confidence. The 
following hypotheses are raised:
(-1) Does judgmental accuracy vary as a function of 
dogmatism, confidence, and appropriateness of confidence?
(2) Do these variables interact with input variables to 
affect judgmental accuracy?
Output Variables
The response mode chosen embodies few of the criti­
cisms made concerning the clinical analogue method.
Dailey's (1960) life history method used as both input and 
output had the advantage of cutting down any error variance 
which would have been engendered by using one type of input 
with a different output. This method has the added advan­
tage of using real events in the lives of normal people.
The format of these cases allowed for the manipulation of
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both amount of information and of the feedback versus no­
feedback dimension. Finally., the judgments made were of a 
general nature, and no previous skill in prediction was as­
sumed.
Method
Judges
Judges (J's) were 90 undergraduates in psychology, 
chosen because of their availability. No restriction was
made in sampling, and these students were considered repre-
t
sentative of the general student population (Hoffeld, pers. 
comm.).
Apparatus
Accuracy of judgments was measured by giving the J's 
a modified version of Dailey's (1966) Programmed Case 
Laboratory. The assumptions underlying the Programmed Case 
method are "that the clinician understands patients through
progressive approximation" and that life history material is
\
the most desired input. In a Programmed Case, J's are asked 
to select from a multiple-choice format a series of true 
events in a given individual's life. In the early portions 
of a Programmed Case, the J has little or no information on 
which to base his choices, and his accuracy in selecting the 
true events is largely a matter of chance. The cases used
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in this investigation were the life of a manufacturing 
executive, Henry Ford (case Me) and a government administra­
tor, Robert Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury under Presi­
dent Eisenhower (case Ga) . According to Dailey (1966, p. 69), 
"the case material was edited to retain only episodes which 
describe fairly objectively what the person did or said in 
a particular situation, time, and place, and thus seemed 
unlikely to have been invented." Each case was edited to 
include approximately 1500 words arranged into 15 segments 
"spanning the life history, arranged in chronological se­
quence (Dailey, 1966, p. 70)."
For each segment, "two alternative events were con­
structed to serve as distractors. The distractors were 
"usually based on actual events from other biographies but 
modified to resemble the situation of the person in the 
biography under study. These multiple-choice guessing al­
ternatives were constructed by nine psychologists to prevent 
bias (Dailey, 1966, p. 70)." The following is a sample from 
a Programmed Case.
This man is a manufacturing executive. You will be 
reading a short account of his life. However, instead of 
reading an ordinary, straightforward life history, you will 
follow a special procedure designed to help you see how well 
you understand him as a human being.
I
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On each page there are several incidents* lettered 
A, B and C. Any one of these incidents could plausibly 
have occurred in his life. Your job is to decide which 
incident did happen.
It is necessary that you not read ahead* and that 
you make a decision before you go on to. each next page.
Then at the top of each page., you will be told which of the 
incidents which you just reviewed on the preceding page was 
actually true of the person's life.
As a result of this procedure., you will experience a
\
gradual improvement in understanding this man. However, do 
not be discouraged if your understanding is inaccurate dur­
ing the first few pages.
If the procedure is clear to you* please_turn the 
page and begin.
PLEASE'PREDICT WHICH EPISODE IS TRUE
A^ While a boy, he disassembled everything from door 
locks to pump valves to learn how devices worked.
His father* a dealer in lumber and farm machinery* 
sometimes found that an implement he had just agreed 
to sell had been taken apart by his son. The father 
spanked him frequently, but the boy always returned 
eventually to tinker with the machinery.
As a farmer's child, he liked to mend broken plows, 
hoes, mowers and reapers. But he tried to avoid 
other chores such as plowing, planting and milking. 
He was never what his father meant when the parent 
said a farmer needed boys.
The son of a distinguished Maine naturalist, he grew 
up surrounded by collections of plants, insects and 
books. He took delight in catching butterflies and 
moths for his father, but never became much inter­
ested in the collections. By the time he was 12, 
the main attraction at home for him was a small 
laboratory that contained two microscopes, several 
Bunsen burners, a few chemicals and numerous beakers.
MAKE YOUR CHOICE BEFORE YOU TURN THE PAGE
IF YOU CHOOSE B^ : You were correct. He was handy at mend­
ing broken plows, hoes, mowers and reapers. But he tried to 
avoid plowing, planting and milking. He was never what his 
father meant when the parent said a farmer needs boys.
NOW DECIDE WHICH EPISODE IS TRUE
At age 12, he rode a horse around the neighborhood, 
picked up clocks and watches and worked late at 
night to repair them. He made watches better than 
new, but he never accepted money for the work. His 
father doubted his mental balance.
His two older brothers complained about having to do 
his chores. After numerous arguments, the older 
brothers gave up the attempt to make him work. Later, 
the youngest boy surprised everyone by doing far more 
than his share of work. But when one of the older 
brothers brought him.a broken cultivator to mend, he 
refused to repair it until the other boys agreed 
that such work would be a part of his chores and that 
he would do less plowing and milking than they.
He became an apprentice to a rural blacksmith, Tom 
Henderson. His work was hot and exhausting, and
4 i
usually it lasted 12 hours a day. But he liked it. 
"Tom gave me an education in how to tinker until you 
find out what makes a machine go. I found out that 
each machine is different— and you can’t be theoreti­
cal. You have to get grease on your hands if you 
want to know the machine."
MAKE YOUR CHOICE BEFORE YOU TURN THE PAGE
33
IF YOU CHOSE A2: You were correct. At 12, he repaired the
neighbors' clocks and watches late at night. He would not 
charge for the repairs, and his father thought he was out 
of his mind.
The validity of the cases can only be inferred, but 
Dailey concluded that "interpersonal understanding or guess­
ing skill is more related to personality variables than to 
intellectual variables (Dailey, 1966, p. 75)."
Confidence was measured by asking each judge to give 
an estimate of his confidence in his judgments, expressed in 
percentages, i.e. 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, follow­
ing each judgment.
Appropriateness of confidence was assessed after
Adams (1957) using the formula A = ^ni/di/ where:
N
_i is any given point on the confidence scale,
/di/is the absolute deviation made at that point, 
ni is the number of judgments made at that point, and 
N is the total number of judgments made.
Dogmatism was measured by giving each of the judges 
the dogmatism scale (Form E).
Procedure ^
Each of the 90 J's was randomly assigned to one of 
the six treatment groups (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1
Summary of Six Treatment Groups for Cases Me and Ga 
Under Conditions N, NFj and FB
Case Case
Conditions Me (Hard) Ga (Easy)
No-Information (N) 15 15
No-Feedback
Minimal-Information (NF) 15 15
No-Feedback
Minimal-Information (FB) 15 
Feedback
15
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In conditions FB-Me, and FB-Ga, the J's were given 
the following instructions:
"This man is a manufacturing Executive (or government 
administrator as the case may be; preliminary investigation 
indicated that case Me was more difficult than case Ga).
You will be reading a short account of his life. However, 
instead of reading an ordinary, straightforward life his­
tory, you will follow a special procedure designed to help 
you see how well you understand him as a human being."
"On each page there are several incidents, lettered 
A, B and C. Any of these incidents could plausibly have 
occurred in his life."
"It is necessary that you do not read ahead, and 
that you make a decision before you go on to each next page. 
Then at the top of each page you will be told which of the 
incidents which you have just reviewed on the preceding 
page was actually true of the person's life."
"As a result of this procedure, you will experience 
a gradual improvement in understanding this man. However, 
do not be discouraged if your understanding is inaccurate 
during the first few pages."
"At the end of each series of three episodes there 
is a space provided for your estimation of the level of 
confidence you have that the response which you-gave as the
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answer was correct. To indicate the extent of confidence 
in your answer, please utilize a percent expressed in a 
whole number from 30% to 100%. Do not use a fraction. If 
the procedure is clear to you, please turn this page and be 
gin. "
The J 's in conditions N-Me and N-Ga were not given 
the minimal information regarding the individual's vocation 
and sexj nor did they receive feedback. The J's in condi­
tions NF-Ga did receive the minimal data,consisting of vo­
cation and sex, but received no-feedback. Finally*the J's 
in conditions FB-Me and FB-Ca received minimal information 
plus feedback. The resultant design is shown in Table;!.
CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
The analysis used is seen in Table 2; each varia­
ble— Dogmatism, Accuracy, Confidence and Appropriateness—  
was divided into High, Medium, and Low groups. Because the 
data for the situational variables of Tests, Conditions, 
and Segments were the same for each analysis, they are pre­
sented individually.
Situational Variables: Confidence 1
Table 3 indicates the Analysis of Variance for Confi­
dence as a dependent variable. This analysis yielded a 
significant Segments effect (p 001) and a Tests x Segments 
effect (p <^.01). Inspection of the means (Figure 2) for the 
Segments effect indicated that Confidence means rose from 
43.2% for Segment one to 46.3% for the second Segment and 
48.8% for the final Segment; the Duncan Multiple Range Test 
(DMRT; Duncan, I960; Table I, Appendix B) indicated that all 
comparisons were significant. Figure 3 shows the means for 
the Tests x Segments interaction. It was noted that Confi­
dence means were uniformly high. The DMRT (Table II, Ap­
pendix B) suggested that Confidence means increased over 
Segments, but only for case Me, the more difficult case.
TABLE 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance*
40
Tests (Me Vs. Ga)
Conditions (N vs. NF vs. FB)
Cognitive Style (Dogmatism* Confidence* Appropriateness of
Confidence and Accuracy
Tests x Levels
Tests x Cognitive Style
Conditions x Cognitive Style
Tests x Conditions x Cognitive Style
Subjects x Groups
l
Segments (three blocks of five judgments)
Tests x Segments
Conditions x Segments
Cognitive Style x Segments
Tests x Conditions x Segments
Tests x Cognitive Style x Segments
Conditions x Cognitive Style x Segments
Tests x Conditions x Cognitive Style x Segments
Segments x Subjects x Groups
*One such analysis for each dependent variable
TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance for Confidence
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Tests 7.1719 1 7.1719 0.0158
Conditions 2151.1406 2 1075.5703 2.3684
Tests x Conditions 376.3828 2 188.1914 0.4144
Subjects x Groups 38147.7344 84 454.1397
Segments 1566.3672 2 783.1836 16 .3944***ii
Tests x Segments 477.9141 2 238.9570 5.0021***
Conditions x Segments 40.5938 4 10.1484 0.2124
Tests x Conditions x
Segments 390.1953 4 97.5488 2.0420
Segments x Subjects 
Groups
X
8025.6016 168 47.7714
*** p <.01 
.'" .001
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Confidence as Cognitive Style
Table I (Appendix A) shows the means and the ranges 
for Confidence as a cognitive style divided into High, 
Medium and Low groups. The Analysis of Variance (Table II, 
Appendix A) indicated that while the groups were splijt on 
Confidence within each cell, no significant differences re­
sulted from this procedure.
Confidence/Accuracy
Table III (Appendix A) revealed no significant dif­
ferences.
Confidence/Appropriateness
The significant main effect indicated (Table 4) that 
Appropriateness means were affected by the J's level of 
confidence (p<^.001). Low Confidence J's obtained an Ap­
propriateness mean of 26.2; the DMRT (Table III, Appendix 
B) indicated that this mean differed significantly from 
both Moderately Confident and Highly Confident J's, whose 
means were 33.1 and 37.1, respectively.
Situational Variables; Accuracy
• That case Me (Table 5) tended to be more difficult 
(Figure 4) than case Ga was reflected in the significant 
Tests effect (p .001). The J's were 46.9% Accurate on 
case Ga, while only 32.3% Accurate on case Me. The barely
\
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TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance for Highj Medium and Low 
Confidence Judges on Appropriateness
Source
Sum of 
Squares
V
df
Mean
Square F
Confidence 5470.82031 2 2735.41016 10.50457***-
Tests x Confidence 1200.75391 2 600.37695 2.30558
Conditions x Confi­
dence 625.34375 4 156.33594 0.60036
Conditions x Tests x 
Confidence 1111.76953 4 277 .94238 1.06736
Subjects x Groups 18748.94141 72 260.40196
Confidence x Segments 851.9102 4 212.9775 1.1444
Confidence x Tests x 
Segments 1543.3086 4 .385.8271 2.0731
Confidence x Con­
ditions x Segments 980.0039 8 122.5005 0.6582
Confidence x Con- 
'ditions x Tests x 
Segments
\ v 
1444.5508 8 180.5688 0.9702
Segments x Subjects 
x Groups 26800.0938 144 186.1118
- —
**** p <^.001
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TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Tests 14373.7070 1 14373.7070 32.1761****
Conditions 2667.4141 2 1333^7070 2.9856*
Tests x Conditions 1156.2930 2 578.1465 1.2942
Subjects x Groups 37524.4492 84 446.7196
Segments 31253.6641 2 15626.8320 36.7549****
Tests x Segments 9747.9688 2 4873.9844 11.4638****
Conditions x Seg­
ments 1635.0078 4 408.7520
1
0.9614
Conditions x Tests 
x Segments 539.9922 4 134.9980 0.3175
Segments x Subjects
x Groups 71427.4766 168 425.1635
* p <  . 06 
**** p .001
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significant Condition effect (p <  ,06) indicated that Ac­
curacy of judgment was affected by the Conditions under
which the judgment was made. Figure 5_showsthe mean Ac-__
curacy for the Conditions.
The correlation coefficient between Accuracy and 
Confidence was -.08; a nonsignificant relationship. The 1 
J's achieved a mean Accuracy of 37.9% under Condition-N 
and 36.9% Accuracy under Condition-NF, while Condition-FB 
yielded an Accuracy rating of 44.0%. The DMRT (Table IV, 
Appendix B) applied to the data indicated that Condition-NF 
did not differ from Condition-N, but did differ from Con­
dition-FB. The significant Segments effect for Accuracy 
is shown in Figure 2. Accuracy jumped from 24.9% for the 
first Segment to 50.5% in the final Segment; the DMRT 
(Table V, Appendix B) indicated that all comparisons were 
significant. The significant Tests x Segments interaction 
is seen in Figure 6. The DMRT (Table VI, Appendix B) indi­
cated that the J's Accuracy increased over Segments for 
case Ga, but this increase was only noted from the first to 
the second Segment for case Me.
Accuracy as Cognitive Style
liTable IV (Appendix A) shows means and ranges for each 
of the Accuracy splits. Table V (Appendix A) shows that the
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groups differed over cases and Conditions, but this was to 
be expected since Accuracy was affected by the difficulty 
of the case and the Condition under which the judgment was 
made.
Accuracy/Appropriateness
Table 6 indicated that only the triple interaction 
Accuracy x Tests x Segments was significant (p ■< -05; Figure 
7) .
Accuracy/Confidence
Table 7 shows the Analysis of Variance for Accuracy 
on Confidence. The significant Accuracy x Segments effect 
(p v^ . 05) is shown in Figure 8. The DMRT (Table VII, Appen­
dix B) indicated that Highly Accurate J's differed in 
Confidence.ratings from Low Accurate J's but no difference 
was found between High and Medium Accurate J's during the 
first Segment. By the second Segment all J's were equally 
Confident. However, by the final Segment the Low Accurate 
J's differed -only from Medium Accurate J's in mean Confidence.
Situational Variables: Appropriateness
From Table VI (Appendix A) it is apparent that Ap­
propriateness of Confidence was not significantly affected 
by any of the situational variables studied.
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and 
Low Accuracy Judges on Appropriateness
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square Fj
Accuracy 5 0 . 9 9 6 0 9 2 2 5 . 4 9 8 0 5 0 . 0 7 0 5 8
Tests x Accuracy 3 6  . 3 1 2 5 0 2 1 8 . 1 5 6 2 5 0 . 0 5 0 2 6
Conditions x Accuracy 4 0 3 . 0 4 2 9 7 4 1 0 0 . 7 6 0 7 4 0 . 2 7 8 9 0
Conditions x Tests x 
Accuracy 6 5 5 . 0 3 9 0 6 4 1 6 3 . 7 5 9 7 7 0 . 4 5 3 2 8
Subjects x Groups 2 6 0 1 2 . 2 3 8 2 8 7 2 3 6 1 . 2 8 1 0 9
Accuracy x Segments 1 5 4 8 . 4 2 9 7 4 3 8 7 . 1 0 7 4 2 . 1 5 1 6
Accuracy x Tests x 
Segments 1 8 8 2 . 6 6 4 1 4 4 7 0 . 6 6 6 0 2 . 6 1 6 1 * *
Accuracy x Conditions 
x Segments 8 3 6 . 6 4 8 4 8 1 0 4 . 5 8 1 1 0 . 5 8 1 3
Accuracy x Conditions 
x Tests x Segments 2 7 4 2 . 5 9 3 8 8 3 4 2 . 8 2 4 2 1 . 9 0 5 5
Segments x Subjects 
x Groups 2 5 9 0 7 . 5 7 4 2 1 4 4 1 7 9 . 9 1 3 7
* *  p  <  . 0 5
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and 
Low Accuracy Judges on Confidence
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Confidence 361.36719 2 180.68359 0.38298
Tests x Accuracy 461.27344 2 230.63672 0.48887
Conditions x Accuracy 771.78906 4 192.94727 0.40898
Conditions x Levels x 
Tests x Accuracy 2585.30469 4 646.32617 1.36998
Subjects x Groups 33968.00000 72 471.77777
Accuracy x Segments 566.7656 4 141.6914 2.9004**
Accuracy x Tests x Seg 
ments 205.7031 4 51.4258 1.0527
Accuracy x Conditions 
x Segments 218.4766 8 27.3096 0.5590
Accuracy x Conditions 
x Tests x Segments 211.4531 8 26.4316 0.5411
Subjects x Groups 7034.6563 144 48.8518
** p <£'.05
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Appropriateness as Cognitive Style
Table VII (Appendix A) shows the means and ranges 
for the Appropriateness split. The analysis of Variance 
for the Appropriateness split is seen in Table VIII (Ap­
pendix A). The nonsignificant F ratio indicated that while 
the groups were split on Appropriateness within each cell, 
no significant differences resulted from this procedure.
Appropriateness/Confidence
Table 8 revealed a significant Appropriateness on 
Confidence main effect (p <^.001). Highly Appropriate J's 
rated their Confidence at 41.2%,while Moderately Appropriate 
J's rated their Confidence at 43.1%. In contrast. Low Appro­
priate J's rated themselves 53.9% Confident. The DMRT (Table 
VIII, Appendix B) applied to the data indicated that Highly 
and Moderately Appropriate J's differ from Low Appropriate­
ness J's, but not from each other.
Appropriateness/Accuracy
Table 9 indicated that only the Appropriateness x 
Conditions x Segments effect reached significance (see Fig­
ure 9) .
Dogmatism as Cognitive Style 
Table IX (Appendix A) shows means and ranges for each 
of the Dogmatism groups. The resultant Analysis of Variance
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance for- High* Medium and Low
Appropriateness Judges on Confidence
Appropr iatene s s 8465.18750 2 4232.59375 11.10226****
Tests x Appro­
priateness 391.22656 2 195.61328 0.51310
Conditions x Ap­
propriateness 411.70313 4 102.92578 0.26998
Conditions x Tests 
x Appropriate^-' 
ness 1430.55469 4 357.63867 0.93810
Subjects x Groups 27449.06250 72 381.23698
Appropriateness x 
Segments 272.0078 4 68.0020 1.3681
Appropriateness x 
Tests x Segments 468.2891 4 117.0723 2.3554
Appropriateness x 
Conditions x Seg 
ments 127.8984 8 15.9873 0.3216
Appropriateness x 
Conditions x Tests 
x Segments 240.0625 8 30.0078 0.6037
Segments x Sub­
jects x Groups
7157.4063 144 49.7042
**** p .001
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and Low 
Appropriateness Judges on Accuracy
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
i'1
Appropriateness 325.19141 2 162.59570 0.35605
Tests x Appropriate- 
Tress 2245.18359 2 1122.59180 2.45823
Conditions x Appro­
priateness 1112.58594 4 278.14648 0.60908
Conditions x Tests x 
Appropriateness 961.48438 4 240.37109 0.52636
Subjects x Groups 32880.00391 72 456.66672
Appropriateness x 
Segments 3102.2969 4 775.5742 1.8855
Appropriateness x 
Tests x Segments 531.1016 4 132.7754 0.3228
Appropriateness x 
Conditions x Seg­
ments 8562.5117 8 1070.3140 .2.6021***
Appropriateness x 
Conditions x Tests 
x Segments 1760.5469 8 220.0684 0.5350
Segments x Subjects 
x Groups 59231.5664 :144 411.3303
*** p <^„01
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(Table X, Appendix A) indicated that while the groups were 
split on Dogmatism within each cell., no significant differ­
ences resulted from this procedure.
Dogmatism/Confidence
Table 10 shows that High* Medium.and Low Dogmatic 
J'a did not differ in their mean Confidence. The signifi­
cant Tests x Dogmatism interaction (p <\05) indicated that 
as Dogmatism increased (Figure 10) Confidence means de­
creased, while on the more difficult case Confidence in­
creased as Dogmatism increased.
Dogmatism/Appropriateness
Appropriateness of Confidence (Table 11) does not 
appear to be related to absolute measures of Dogmatism.
The Tests x Dogmatism interaction is seen in Figure 11.
The general slope of the curves indicated that Low Dogmatic 
J's tended to be more Appropriate on easy cases. The inter­
action was significant, but the DMRT (Table IX, Appendisf 5) 
revealed none of tbe means differed significantly from one 
another. The Conditions x Dogmatism effect (Figure 12) 
indicated that Low Dogmatic J's did not differ under^Con- 
ditions-N, NF, and FB; however, the DMRT v(Table X, Appendix 
B) indicated that High Dogmatic J's differed significantly 
from other High Dogmatic J's under Condition-N*-
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TABLE 10
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and
Low Dogmatic Judges on Confidence
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square
1
F
Dogmatism 106.69531 2 53.34766 0.11862
Tests x Dogmatism 3005.71875 2 1502.85938 3.34161**
Conditions x Dogma 
tism 1656.59375 4 414.14844 0.92086
Conditions x Tests 
x Dogmatism 997.39844 4 249.34961 0.55443
Subjects x Croups 32381.32813 72 449.74067
Dogmatism x Seg­
ments 262.3672
1
4 65.,5918\ ' 1.2471
Dogmatism x Tests 
x Segments 67.2656 4 16.8164 0.3197
Dogmatism x Con­
ditions x Seg­
ments 121.9375 8 15.2422 0.2898
Dogmatism x Con­
ditions x Tests 
x Segments 318.5547 8 39.8193 0.7571
Segments x Subjects
x Groups 7574.0313 144 52.5974
** p <^’ = 05
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and
Low Dogmatic Judges on Appropriateness
Source
Siam of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Dogmatism 40.76172 2 20.38086 0.06959
Tests x Dogmatism 2017.86719 2 1008.93359 3.44521**
Conditions x Dogmatism 3929.64844 4 982.41211 3.35465**
Conditions x Tests x 
Dogmatism 84.09766 4 21.02441 0.07179
Subjects x Groups 21085.25391 72 292.85075
Dogmatism x Segments 560.9961 4 140.2490 0,7476
Dogmatism x Tests x 
Segments 223.5273 4 55.8818 0.2979
Dogmatism x Conditions 
x Segments
2376.5586 8 297.0698 1.5835
Dogmatism x Conditions 
x Tests x Segments 382.9297 8
1-
47.8662 0.2552
Segments x Subjects x 
Groups 27014.2344 144 187.5988
** p <^ = 05
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Dogmatism/Accurady
The Dogmatism on Accuracy main effect (Table 12) was 
significant at the .05 level of Confidence. Low Dogmatic 
Js1 mean Accuracy was 36.4%, while Medium Dogmatic J's were 
able to achieve 43.9% Accuracy, against 38.4% for High Dog­
matic J's. The DMRT (Table XI, Appendix B) applied to the 
data indicated that Medium Dogmatic J's were significantly 
more Accurate than Low Dogmatic J's, but this difference 
did not obtain for the Medium Dogmatic-High Dogmatic com­
parison. Once again the Conditions x Dogmatism interaction 
failed to reach significance, indicating that amount of 
initial information or feedback-of-results was not signifi­
cantly related to Accuracy.
1
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TABLE 12
\
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and
Low Dogmatic Judges on Accuracy
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Dogmatism 2671.85938 2 1335.92969 3.12566**
Tests x Dogmatism 280.73828 2 140.36914 0.32842
Conditions x Dogma­
tism
1765.91797 4 441.47949 1.03292
Conditions x Tests 
x Dogmatism 2032.59766 4 508.14941 1.18891
Subjects x Groups 30773.33594 72 427.40744
Dogmatism x Segments 1639.8945 4 409.9736 0.9152
Dogmatism x Tests x 
Segments 1890.7500 4 472.6875 1.0552
Dogmatism x Condi­
tions x Segments , 3392.51561 8 424.0645 0.9467
Dogmatism x Condi­
tions x Tests x 
Segments 1780.2266 8 222.5283 0.4968
Segments x Subjects 
x Groups 64504.3164
---------i,---
144 447.9466
** P <^ '*05
CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
Situational Variables: Confidence
While significant differences are to be desired* of 
greater interest to a discussion of Confidence is lack of 
significant differences. First* it was noted that mean 
Confidence was not affected by case difficulty. Figure 4 
shows Confidence means plotted against Accuracy means;
I
while it is apparent that case Me is significantly more
N
difficult than case Ga* this did not significantly affect
I
the Confidence means. The significant Segments effect ap­
proximated what others have found. It was noted that mean 
Confidence for judgments made under Condition-N was 45.0%* 
while.the J's in Condition-NF achieved a mean Confidence of 
43.0%. Similarly J's rating their Confidence under Con- 
dition-FB obtained a Confidence mean of 49.9%. It could be 
argued that measures of Confidence obtained under a variety 
of Conditions are relatively stable and reflect .intra-indi­
vidual stability* While Confidence measures made from Seg­
ment to Segment or moment-to-moment are what Little (1961)
called Certainty. He argued "there is substantial evidence
  \
that Confidence is unrelated to either Accuracy or relia­
bility of judgments* but is a quite stable personality char­
acteristic* whereas Certainty is quite positively related to
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l
reliability of judgment and is much more determined by the
immediate judgment (p. 100)." The present data seemed to
I
support Little* since the only Confidence means that varied 
significantly were those measured over Segments or varied 
with case difficulty over Segments. Those absolute measures 
of Confidence for Tests* Conditions* or Tests x Conditions 
yielded no significant effects.
Regarding the relationship between Confidence and 
Accuracy* Oskamp (1965* p. 262) maintained that if a judge 
"got 28% of|the items correct and had an average Confidence 
level of 43% he could clearly be said to be overconfident." 
Figure 2 pictures J's in the first Segment as clearly over­
confident; however*1 by the second and third Segments Confi­
dence and Accuracy means approached one another. This 
failure to replicate Oskamp's findings (1965) is accounted 
for by the nature of the task (more will be said about this 
in a later section). Nevertheless* it should be noted that 
if case Me were plotted against Confidence means* Oskamp's 
general findings would be supported.
Confidence as Cognitive Style
Confidence/Accuracy
Treating Confidence as a cognitive style or mediator 
variable indicated that amount of Confidence was not a
I70
predictor of Accuracy. Highly Confident J’s achieved a mean 
Accuracy of 40.2%, Moderately Confident J's scored 39.4% vs. 
39.1% Accuracy for Low Confident J's. This finding is dis­
cordant with that of other investigators (Apostolakos, 1957; 
Weinstein and Johnson, 1963; Porer and Tolman, 1952; Watley, 
1966; Little, 1961), who found what appeared to be an in­
verse relationship between Confidence and accuracy. The most 
parsimonious explanation was found in a review of the various 
scaling techniques employed. An investigation of this varia­
ble indicated that other investigators used ordinal scales 
ranging from three points for Forer and Tolman (1952), to 
four for Little (1961), five for Weinstein and Johnson (1963), 
and nine for Watley (1966). Oskamp (1965) used a ratio 
scale similar to that used in this investigation but did 
not report his data in a manner that would facilitate com-
i
parison. The point is made that Confidence as a cognitive 
style may not be as much related to Accuracy as it is to 
the method used to assess Confidence. Preliminary data 
being gathered by Gadol (1968) indicates that when a judge 
gives a verbal estimate of his Confidence, i.e., very Confi­
dent, the estimate of Accuracy can vary from 20 to 50%. The 
question of the relationship between Accuracy and Confidence 
appears complex; and the necessity for defining Certainty vs. 
Confidence when using interval scaling techniques cannot be
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stressed too strongly.
Confidence/Appropriateness
Oskamp (I960) maintained that "the Appropriateness 
measure is a better indication of judgmental expertness 
than is Accuracy, and it is therefore suggested as a major 
criterion variable in future prediction studies." The 
perspicacity of this statement is found in the result indi­
cating that Low Confidence J's were more Appropriate in 
their judgments (Table 4). The point is that Appropriate­
ness of judgment may be a more stable variable than Confi­
dence. Why Low Confidence J's were more Appropriate in 
their judgments may be difficult to interpret; however, it 
may be useful to point out that in a difficult judgmental 
task the best estimate of Accuracy would be chance. If 
the probability of a correct decision was chance, a judg­
ment made at this level would be rated as highly appro­
priate. This interpretation would appear to have some 
validity, since Moderately Confident and Highly Confident 
J's did not differ in their Appropriateness means. However, 
the point remains that Low Confidence appears to predict 
High Appropriateness of judgment— a point to consider in 
future research.
i
Situational Variables; Accuracy
The early pilot study indicated that case Me was the
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more difficult. There may be several explanations for this 
noted difference. For example., case Me was the life of 
Henry Ford; he was not a contemporary of the J's nor was 
he a very predictable man in any sense. Clinically it 
could be argued that he was at least a neurotic, and one 
might postulate that neurotic behavior is less predictable 
than normal behavior. If this notion is tenable, it could 
be.argued that the reason judges in other investigations 
achieved1 such low accuracy was related to, the fact that
i
judgments based on neurotic or psychotic case material would 
be less reliable due to the low consistency of the behaviors 
to be predicted. A review of the literature by Gadol (1968) 
concluded that the relationship between extent of pathology 
and predictability of behavior had not been established. 
While .this is post hoc reasoning, and no attempt was made to
l
vary the cases along a normal-neurotic dimension, there is 
presumptive evidence for such a dimension. Miller and Bieri 
(1963, p. 322), investigating the channel capacities of in­
formation, varied the pathology of the judged sample from 
normal to psychotics with situational neurosis, anxiety hys-
r
teria, obsessive compulsive, character disorder, psychopath, 
and borderline psychosis intervening. They concluded that 
"there.is more information held in common by the three judg­
ment systems (.63 bits) than held in common, uniquely, by 
any two judgment system. This would suggest that the
I
subjects may have been responding along.some common under­
lying dimension as they made their judgments. In view of 
the fact that the case stimuli were known to have been ' 
ordered along a pathology continuum., it is quite possible 
that this common underlying response dimension was, in fact, 
a pathology continuum." A further dimension that may have 
varied, contributing to the observed difference in Accuracy 
between cases, is stereotyping. Several investigators have 
argued that stereotypes could be very useful in the judgmen­
tal situation (Taft, 1955; Crow and Hammond, 1957; Geertsma 
and Stoller, 1960). It is possible that since Henry Ford 
was from.a time period far removed from that of the J's, 
their present-day stereotype of a manufacturing executive 
was not compatible with the input material. Secondly, Ford 
deviated so much that stereotypic responses could have put 
the judges at a disadvantage. For example, the following 
are examples of correct responses taken from case Me— "at 
12, he repaired the neighbors' clocks and watches late at 
night. He would not charge for the repairs, and his father 
thought he was out of his mind." Another example of a cor­
rect response that deviated from the stereotype of a manu­
facturing executive was, "his school marks worried his father. 
The boy never learned to spell, to read freely or express 
himself in even the simplest written sentences." Perhaps
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the point is Joeing overemphasized, but it is clear that 
Me differed from case Ga in difficulty.
Although one case is more.difficult, the J's demon­
strated an overall ability to gain from practice (Figure 2). 
It is clearly evident that J's can learn to be more Accurate; 
less clear are the conditions under which this general capac­
ity (Cline and Richards, 1960, 1961) can be maximized. An 
additional observation was that learning.was curtailed when 
the variable of case difficulty was introduced. The signifi­
cant Tests x Segments interaction (Figure 6) indicated that 
Accuracy increased over the three segments for case Ga but 
fell off near chance by the third Segment for case Me.
Based on the previous arguments, it will be concluded that 
neurotic or non-stereotypic case material does not result in 
the same gradual buildup of understanding as material that 
does not vary in this manner.
In addition, it was noted that Accuracy was maximal 
under Condition-FB; this finding indicates that if judgmen­
tal situations could be manipulated so as to maximize feed­
back, Accuracy could be enhanced. Further, it was noted 
that Condition-N did not differ from Condition-NF; the con­
clusion supported by the literature (Cline and Richards,
1960; Dymond, 1953; Hathaway, 1956; Leventhal, 1957; J„
Weiss, 1963) indicated that minimal information consisting 
of age, sex, and vocation accounted for nearly all variance
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associated with predictive accuracy. It was pointed out that 
previous studies had confounded amount of information with- 
source, sequence* and relevance of information. In the 
present investigation source was held constant* since all of 
the information came from a single source* namely the indi­
vidual ' s life history; sequence of information was controlled* 
since the predictions to he made were developmentally ad­
ditive. Therefore* each case was developed so that material 
presented in the early Segments were those events which oc­
curred early in the individual's life. Lastly* since all 
input information concerned events in a single individual's 
life* it was assumed to he highly relevant (at least for 
case Ga). The finding that Condition-N did not differ from 
Condition-NF could he accounted for on the basis of reduced 
error variance* due to greater control of confounding varia­
bles. In this investigation the conclusion would have to be 
that feedback does enhance Accuracy* while minimal informa­
tion consisting of sex and vocation did not. In fact* there 
was a mild tendency for the J's in Condition-N to do slightly 
better than those J's provided with minimal information.
Accuracy as Cognitive Style
Accuracy/Appropriateness
The general slope of the triple interaction (Figure
7) indicated that Low and Medium Accurate J's became less
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Appropriate in their judgments by Segment three., especially 
for case Me., the more difficult case. However, Highly Ac­
curate J's became very Appropriate in their judgments by 
Segment three for case Me. If, as has been argued, case Me 
is more difficult because the individual judged deviated 
from normality or from some stereotypic baseline, then J's 
who are Highly Appropriate in such a situation may be indi­
viduals who are'to break stimulus sets. These individuals 
have been described as Field-Independent (Witkin, 1962).
In a separate study, Weingold and Lachin (1968) assessed 
the correlation between Accuracy and a measure of Field 
Dependence-Independence and found it to be -.15; while not 
significant,. it was in the predicted direction.
Accuracy/Confidence
Here the interpretive problem is to explain why most 
investigators found a relationship between levels of Confi­
dence and measures of Accuracy, while this investigator 
found a relationship between levels of Accuracy and measures 
of Confidence. Failure to replicate other investigators 
regarding Confidence on Accuracy was related to methodologi­
cal difference. The possibility that the Accuracy on 
Confidence findings are an artifact of design cannot be dis­
missed.
Situational Variables; Appropriateness
Interpretation of the negative findings shows Appro­
priateness to be a rather stable variable* since it was 
affected by any of the situational variables studied.
Appropriateness as Cognitive Style
Appropriateness/Confidence
The usefulness of Appropriateness as ^ predictor 
variable was seen in the Appropriateness main effect (Table
8). The implication is that Highly Appropriate J's rated 
the Confidence of their judgments lower than did Moderately 
or Low Appropriate J's. A possible interpretation is that 
some J’s have a cognitive style such that in any judging
situation they tend to judge that they will be wrong or
)
function at chance* since most research has shown that Ac­
curacy in judgment situations seldom exceeds 60%; a state­
ment of Confidence at the chance level would be highly 
appropriate.
Appropriateness/Accuracy
Interpreting a triple interaction is always risky; 
however* the figures seem to indicate a fairly straight­
forward interpretation. Figure 9 shows that while High, 
Medium and Low Appropriate J's performed approximately the 
same over Segments and under Conditions-N and NF* this did 
not appear to be the case for J's under Conditions-FB.
i
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Here it was noted that High and Low Appropriate J's were the 
most accurate. Using Oskamp's definition of Appropriateness 
(1965., p. 261), "a good index of the expertness of a judge 
is the relationship between his level of Confidence and his 
level of Accuracy. This measure shows, for instance, 
whether the judge is overconfident or underconfident in 
making.his decisions." In the present situations, it would 
be possible to conclude that overconfident and underconfi- 
dent J's are the most Accurate, but only in Condition-FB.
Dogmatism as Cognitive Style
While this investigation has been concerned with 
ascertaining the various contributions of Accuracy, Appro­
priateness, and Confidence as predictor variables, the 
major focus in terms of the conceptual model has been Dog­
matism. Here Dogmatism was viewed as the relative openness 
or closedness of the cognitive system. Using Lewin's 
topology (Hall and Lindzey,'1957) to conceive of Dogmatism 
as a measure of the cognitive medium through which informa- 
, tion is processed, the following observations from Lewin's 
field theory are relevant: "Lewin has distinguished several
properties of the medium, the most important of which is the
i
fluidity-rigidity dimension. A fluid medium is one that 
responds quickly on any influence that is brought to bear 
on it. It is flexible and pliant. A rigid medium resists
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change. It is stiff and inelastic (Hall and Lindzey, 1957, 
p. 217)." According to this view, the cognitive structure 
of High Dogmatic J ’s would be rigid and lack permeability, 
while the cognitive structure of Low Dogmatic J's would be 
fluid and highly permeable. Medium Dogmatics would fall 
midway between the fluidity-rigidity dimension and hence 
their cognitive boundaries would be selectively permeable.
At this point, the data regarding Dogmatism as a description 
of the relative fluidity-rigidity of the medium will be re­
viewed in order to see how well this concept can predict 
accuracy of judgment. The significant Dogmatism effect 
(Table 2) lends partial credence to this conceptualization. 
Medium Dogmatic J's were indeed more Accurate in their judg­
ments than Low Dogmatic J's; however, Medium Dogmatic J's 
did not differ from High Dogmatic J's. The shape of the 
distribution indicated that differences might have occurred 
if more cases were used. A further test of the fluidity- 
rigidity model would be found if Medium Dogmatic J's 
differed from Low or High Dogmatic J's relative to Condi­
tions . However, the Conditions x Dogmatism interaction 
failed to reach significance (Table 12). Figure 13 shows 
the Accuracy means for High, Medium and Low Dogmatic J's 
over Conditions N, NF, and FB.
If the three Conditions are viewed as defining two 
relatively discrete functions, information and feedback, a
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comparison of Condition-N vs. Condition-NF would demonstrate 
the value of initial information to High, Medium, and Low 
Dogmatic J's. A comparison of NF vs. FB would indicate the 
value of feedback to High, Medium and Low Dogmatic J's.
This analysis would serve to furnish more information about 
the viability of the fluidity-rigidity model. Statistically, 
the problem was suited to a paired comparison analysis; the 
DMRT was selected as the proper statistic. The DMRT (Table
I
XII, Appendix B) indicated that for the comparisons N vs.
NF, none of the means differed .significantly— radicating 
that initial information was not a salient variable in the 
processing of information. In the comparison NF vs. FB,
I
Medium Dogmatic J's in Condition-FB were significantly more 
Accurate than Medium Dogmatic J's in Condition-NF— indicating 
that Medium Dogmatic J's were significantly more Accurate if 
feedback were the variable investigated. A final test of 
the fluidity-rigidity model of cognitive style would be the 
demonstration of within group differences between High, 
Medium, and Low Dogmatic J's. In comparing High, Medium,
i
and Low Dogmatic J's under Condition-NF, no significant 
differences were found. However, when Medium Dogmatic J's 
under Condition-FB were compared to Low Dogmatic J's in the 
same Condition, significant differences were obtained. This 
finding is interpreted to mean that Medium Dogmatic J 's
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utilized feedback more efficiently than Low Dogmatic J's.
Complete predictive efficacy of the model would be 
seen if Medium Dogmatics were more Accurate than High Dog­
matic J's (rigid cognitive structure); the data does not 
support this contention, but High Dogmatic J's consistently 
performed'.in the direction of decreased Accuracy.
Partial validation of the model is evident in the 
Tests x Dogmatism on Appropriateness interaction (Figure 
11). If, as argued. High Dogmatic J's have a relatively 
rigid cognitive structure through which little information 
is processed; and if individuals use internal stereotypes 
to make decisions; then it would be expected that High Dog­
matic J's would be less Appropriate on that case which 
deviated most from some internal stereotype. Similarly,
High Dogmatic J 's would function well in situations that 
deviated little from their own internal stereotype. If 
Low Dogmatic J's are seen as having a fluid cognitive 
structure which is highly permeable, it might be argued 
that since case Ga represented inputs which could be eval­
uated on the basis of existing stereotypes, Low Dogmatic 
J's would then process information of a type they already 
possess, causing some redundancy in the system. It has been 
shown that increasing amount of information does not result 
in greater predictive validity. The argument is made that 
Low Dogmatic J's were least Appropriate on case Ga, because
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the case material did not differ appreciably from stereo­
type inputs they already possessed. On the other hand, Low 
Dogmatics were more Appropriate on case Me because amount
I
of input in this case provided greater information. Lastly, 
Medium Dogmatic J's did not function differentially over 
cases because they could selectively weight incoming infor­
mation. While the nature of the slopes supports this 
argument, the DMRT on the means revealed nonsignificant 
difference. Because High Dogmatics have a rigid cognitive 
system which is relatively self-contained, they need little 
in the nature of inputs. Figure 12 indicates that High Dog­
matics are most Appropriate under gonditions of no-information 
and no-feedback. Similarly, because Low Dogmatics possess a 
' fluid and permeable cognitive system which is highly re­
active incoming information, their ability to make appro­
priate judgments falls off as a function of increasing 
information (Figure 12) .
I
The relevance of Dogmatism as a mediational construct 
that varied along Lewin's fluidity-rigidity dimension was 
explored. It was argued that Dogmatism could be viewed as a 
measure of the relative fluidity or rigidity of the cognitive 
structure. Medium Dogmatic J's were viewed as having cogni­
tive systems that were selectively permeable, allowing them 
to selectively weigh incoming information. Low Dogmatic
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J's were seen as having highly permeable systems that were 
considerably more open to incoming information, while High 
Dogmatic J's had rigid and inaccessible cognitive systems.
i
CHAPTER VIII
An Evaluation and Implications for Future Research
The results tended to support the contention that 
Dogmatism can be used as a mediational concept. Low Dog­
matic J's were consistently more Accurate than Medium
i
Dogmatic J's; the failure of High Dogmatic J's to differ 
significantly from Medium Dogmatic J's might be explained 
on the basis of the small number of judgments made; per­
haps the expected differences would have materialized if 
more judgments were required. Secondly* the decision to 
split on Dogmatism within each cell* necessitated by the 
manner in which the data were collected* may have affected 
the results in a manner difficult to determine. The size 
of the sample and the restricted range of Dogmatism scores 
found in a college sample are also variables that require
i 1
closer attention. Lastly* it is possible that the model is 
not viable* and the differences noted are related to an 
argument advanced by Becker {1967* p. 28)s who presented an 
interesting alternative to the argument that High and Low 
Dogmatic J's differ in the relative rigidity and fluidity 
of their cognitive boundaries; his hypothesis was that "S/s 
in the middle range of the distribution of Dogmatism scores 
tended to be open-minded* and that jS's either below or above
j
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that range tended to be closed-minded." In other words, 
both High and Low Dogmatic J's were closed-minded; only 
Dogmatic J's were open-minded. A comparison of the means 
for the Dogmatism on Accuracy main effect showed that Low 
Dogmatic J's mean Accuracy was 36.4%, compared to 38.4% for 
High Dogmatic J's, a difference which was not significant. 
These data would seem to support Becker's hypothesis; how­
ever, this position would be viable only if both these 
scores differed from Medium Dogmatic J's. It is clear that 
conceptualizing Dogmatism as a curvilinear predictor has 
merit, and future research should pursue this concept.
The implications for future research are many; if 
the fluidity-rigidity model is viable, it should be possi­
ble to construct situations which test various aspects of 
the model. For example, if High Dogmatic J's are rela­
tively resistant to incoming information, then the amount 
of information furnished them should not materially affect 
their judgments. Thus, it would be possible to construct 
a judging situation in which information expressed in bits 
could be manipulated. The model would predict that High 
Dogmatic J's would do poorly relative to Low and Medium
i
Dogmatics in the early stages of the judging situation. 
However, High Dogmatic J's would demonstrate greater rela­
tive predictive validity as more information was fed into
i
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the system* because the model would predict that Low and* to 
■a lesser degree* Medium Dogmatic J's would be inundated with 
input information.
More data should be collected with regard to a spe­
cific population of decision makers: lawyers* doctors* mana­
gers and clinical psychologists. If the model should prove 
viable, a way to modify the degree of existing Dogmatism 
should be sought. Lastly* studies should be conducted to 
determine how individuals develop differing levels of Dogma- 
,tism.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE I
Means and Ranges for High* Medium and Low Confidence
Judges for Cases and Conditions
Conditions Conditions Conditions
N X NF X FB X
LO 30.0-32.6 30.8 30.0-34.6 32.5 33.3-40.0 36.8
Cases GA Md 34.0-44.8 40.0 38.0-42.0 39.3 44.0-56.0 51.2
Hi 46.0-74.6 61.9 42.0-80.0 54.5 60.0-78.6 66.4
Lo 32.6-41.3 37.8 30.0-38.0 35.8 32.0-40.0 36.6
Cases ME Md 44.0-49.3 45.8 40.6-42.6 41.3 42.0-49.3 46.2
Hi 51.3-56«.6 53.5 44.6-71.3 56.4 52.6-80.7 62.5
VOvo
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TABLE Si
Analysis of Variance for Confidence by 
Cases and Conditions
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Ksss=s=rr-....i m '
Mean
Square F
Tests 1.94141 1 1.94141 0.01283
Conditions 715.08008 2 357.54004 2.36376
Tests ?c Con­
ditions 124.42578 2 62.21289 0.41130
error 12705.74219 84 151.25883
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TABLE III
Analysis of Variance for High, Medium and Low 
Confidence Judges on Accuracy
Sum of Mean
Source Squares df Square F
Confidence 58.52344 2 29.26172
j
0.06834
Tests x Cpnfidence 1036.29297 2 518.14648 1.21020
Conditions x Confi­
dence
t
3019.25391 4 754.81348 1.76297
Conditions x Tests 
x Confidence 2583.70703 4 645.92676 1.50865
Subjects x Groups 30826.67188 72 428.14822
Confidence x Seg­
ments 1197.3633 4 299.3408 0.6566
Confidence x Tests x 
Segments 2448.3945 4 612.0986 1.3427
Confidence x Con­
ditions x Segments 2134.2461 8 266.7808 0.5852
Confidence x Con­
ditions x Tests x 
Segments 5309.5195 8 663.6899 1.4558
Segments x Subjects 
x Groups 65647.4727 144 455.8852
i
TABLE IV
Means and Ranges for High, Medium and Low Accuracy
Judges for Cases and Conditions
Conditions Conditions Conditions
N X NF X FB X
Lo 33.3-40.0 37.3 33.3-40.0 37.3 13.3-40.0 31.9
Cases GA Md 40.0-46.6 43.3 46.6-46.6 46.6 46.6-53.3 49.3
Hi 46.6-53.3 50.6 46.6-66.0 57.2 53.3-93.3 61.2
Lo 13.3-20.0 18.7 13.3-26.6 19.9 20.0-26.6 23.9
Cases ME Md 26.6-40.0 31.9 26.6-26.6 26.6 33.3-40.0 37.3
Hi 40.0-53.3 45.3 33.3-33.3 33.3 40.0-60.0 53.3
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TABLE V
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy 
by Cases and Conditions
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square P
Tests 4867.93164 1 4867.93164 33.28417****
Conditions 948.46680 2 474.23340 3.24254**
Tests x Conditions 365.32617 2 182.66309 1.24895
error .12285.30859 84 146.25367
** P <-05
**** p <.001
!
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TABLE VI
Analysis of Variance for Appropriateness
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Tests 43.9805 1 43.9805 0.1360
Conditions 341.4063 2 170.7031 0.5280
Tests x Conditions 78.2109 2 39.1055 0.1210
Subjects x Groups 27157.6289 84 323.3051
Segments 119.7148 2 59.8574 0.3333
Tests x Segments 53.9023 2 26.9512 0.1500
Conditions x Segments 181.2148 4 45.3037 0.2522
Tests x Conditions x 
Segments 448.4102 4 112.1025 0.6241
Segments x Subjects x 
Groups 30175.3164 168 179.6150
TABLE VII
Means and Ranges for High, Medium and Low Appropriateness
Judges for Cases and Conditions
Conditions Conditions Conditions
N X NF X FB X
Lo 3.0-10.0 6.4 3.0-15.5 9.4 5.8-16.0 11.8
Cases GA Md 13.9-23.3 19.0 17.0-24.5 19.8 17.3-22.7 19.1
Hi 28.7-37.3 33.8 25.1-50.5 37.9 27.5-44.9 40.3
Lo 14.7-21.0 17.9 7.4-17.8 11.9 5.0-16.8 11.2
Cases ME Md 21.2-27.4 25.5 22.3-26.0 24.5 19.3-27.9 23.7
Hi 30.3-44.8 35.6 26.6-44.7 31.8 29.7-70.0 41.5
SO
T
1.06
TABLE VIII
Analysis of Variance for Appropriateness 
by Cases and Conditions
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
i
Tests 186.75000 1 186.75000 1.18066
Conditions 67.11084 2 33.55542 0.21214
Tests x Conditions 161.24561 2 80.62280 0.50971
error 13286.65479 84 158.17446
TABLE IX
Means and Ranges for High., Medium and Low Dogmatic
Judges for Cases and Conditions
N X NF X FB X
Hi 167-198 179.0 172-180 177.6 148t172 159.4
Cases GA Md 144-166 152.4 147-161 153.2 123-147 135.0
Lo 105-138 118.4 122-144 129.0 108-123 113.0
Hi 160-196 173.6 159-181 173.0 161-180 170.2
Cases ME Md 141-155 150.0 147-158 151.4 147-154 149.4
Lo 128-136 132.2 97-140 128.6 122-144 127.0
1.07
TABLE X
Analysis of Variance for Dogmatism by-
Cases and Conditions
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Square F
Tests 410.46875 1 410.46875 0.83995
Conditions 1713.43750 2 856.71875 1.75312
Tests x Conditions 939.00000 2 469.50000 0.96075
error 41049.35938 84 488.68285
APPENDIX B
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TABLE I
Multiple Comparisons of Confidence Means Over Segments 
Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
Shortest Significant
SEGMENTS S1 S2 S3 (Ranges for
MEANS 43.05 46.31 48.94
A S1 43.05 3.26 5.89 S
d
to
II to • o
B s2 46.31 2.63 R3=2.15
C S3 j48.94
A B C
TABLE II
Multiple Comparison of Confidence Means Over Tests x Segments
Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
TEST x SEGMENTS A B C D E F
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p .05-
Means 41.46 44.64 45.87 46.75 47.31 50.58
A Me S1 41.46 3.18 4.41 5.29 5.85 9.12 0000•CM11CMPh
B Ga 44.64 1.23 2.11 2.67 5.94 R3=3.04
C Ga S2 45.87 .88 1.44 4.71i v 3*14
D Me S2 46.75 .56 3.83 R =3.21 5
E Ga S^ 47.31 3.27 R =3.27 6
F Me S3 50.58
A B C D E F
-
IT
T
TABLE III
Multiple Comparison of Appropriateness Means 
for High, Medium and Low Confidence Judges 
Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
-
Means Lo Md Hi
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p <^  .05
A Lo 26.182
26.182 33.105
6.92
37.075
10.89 R2=4.81
B Md 33.105 3.97 R3=5.06
C Hi 37.075
A B C
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TABLE IV
Multiple Comparison of Accuracy Means for Conditions
N, NF, and FB Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
\
CONDITIONS
Means
A
NF
36.89
B
N
37.89
C
FB
44.00
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p .05
A NF 36.89 1.0 7.11 R2=6.37
B N 37.89 6.11 R3=6.71
C FB 44.00
A B C
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TABLE V
Multiple Comparison of Accuracy Means Over Segments Using
the Duncan Multiple Range Test
SEGMENTS S1 S2 S3
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p ^ .05
Means 24.94 43.35 50.48
A si 24.94 18.41 25.54 R2=6.08
B S2 43.35 7.13 R3=6.41
C S3
50.48
*■
S1 S2 S3
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TABLE VI
Multiple Comparison of Accuracy Means for Tests x Segments
Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
Shortest Significant
TESTS x SEGMENTS A B C D E F Ranges for
Means 18.22 31.67 35.55 43.11 43.59 65.41
A Me S1 18.22 13.45 17.33 24.89 25.37 47.19 R2=8.61
B Ga S1 31.67 3.88 11.44 11.92 33.74 R3=9.06
C Me S3 35.55 7.56 8.04 29.86 R4=9.36
D Me S2 43.11 .48 22.30 R5=9.58
E Ga S2 43.59 21.82 R6=9.75
F Ga S3 65.41
A B C D E F
Hf-*
TABLE VII
Multiple Comparison of Confidence Means for High, Medium and Low Accuracy
Judges for Segments Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
SBcnft^ E^^ SrgftiS-cant
ACCURACY x SEGMENTS A B C D E F G H j Ranges for P 05
Means 41.20 42.23 44.40 45.73 46.40 46.93 48.13 48.13 51.76
A S! H 41.20 1.03 3.20 4.53 5.20 5.73 6.93 6.93 10.56 R2=3.57
B S1 M 42.23 2.17 3.50 4.17 4.70 5.90 5.90 9.53 R3=3.76
C S2 H 44.40 1.33 2.00 2.53 3.73 3.73 7.36 R4=3.88
D S1 L 45.73 .67 1.20 2.40 2.40 6.03 R5=3.98
E S2 L 46.40 .53 1.73 1.73 5.36 Rg=4.05
F S3 L 46.93 1.20 1.20 4.83 R?=4.10
G S2 M 48.13 - 3.63 Rg=4.15
H S3 H 48.13 3.63 Rg=4.19
I S3 M 51.76
A B C D E F G H I
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TABLE VIII
Multiple Comparison of Confidence Means for High., Medium and Low Appropriateness
Judges Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
Lo Md
1
Hi
Means 41.28
1
43.1)6 53.95
A Lo 41.28 1.78 10.67
B Md 43.06 10.89
C Hi 53.95
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p <^  . 05
R =5.8205 
2
R =6.1229 
3
A B
LI
T
TABLE IX
Multiple Comparison of Appropriateness Means for High., Medium and Low 
Dogmatic Judges for Cases Ga and Me Using 
the Duncan Multiple Range Test
DOGMATISM x TESTS A B C D E P
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p ^  .05
Means 28.59 29.50 31.29 31.86 35.27 36.21
A Ga Hi 28.59 .91 2.70 3.27 6.68 7.62 R2=7.22
B Me Lo 29.50 1.79 2.36 5.77 6.71 R3=7.59
C Ga M 31.29 .57 3.98 4.92 R4=7.84
D Me M 31.86 3.41 4.35 R =8.02D
E Ga Lo 35.27 .94 R =8.16 6
G Me Hi 36.21
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TABLE X
Multiple Comparison of Appropriateness Means for High, Median and Low Dogmatic
Judges Under Conditions N, NF, and FB Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
DOGMATISM x Shortest Significant
CONDITIONS A B c D E F G H I Ranges for p .05
Means 24.25 27.77 29.27 32.69 32.76 33.93 35.40 35.59 37.38
A N Hi 24.25 3.52 5.02 8.44 8.51 9.68 11.15 11.34 13.13 R2=8.84
B NF Lo 27.77 1.50 4.92 4.99 6.16 7.63 7.82 9.61 R3=9.30
C FB M 29.27 3.42 3.49 4.66 6.13 6.32 8.11 R =9.60 4
D NF M 32.69 .07 1.24 2.71 2.90 4.69 R5=9.82
E N M 32.76 1.21 2.68 2.87 4.66 R =9.99
F FB Lo 33.93 ■ 1.47 1.66 3.45 R?=10.13
G N Lo 35.40 .19 1.98 Rg=10.24
H NF Hi 35.59 1.79 Rg=10.33
I FB Hi 37.38
A
i
B C D E F G H I
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TABLE XI
Multiple Comparison of Accuracy Means for High, Medium and Low Dogmatic
Judges Using the Duncan Multiple Range Test
Lo Md Hi
Shortest Significant 
Ranges for p <  .05
Means 36.44 38.44 43.89
A Lo 36.44 2.0 7.45 R2=6.16
B Hi 38.44 5.45 R3=6.49
C Md 43.89
A B C
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\TABLE XII
Multiple Comparison of Accuracy Means for High, Medium and Low Dogmatic 
Judges Under Conditions N, NF, and FB Using 
'l the Duncan Multiple Range Test
Dogmatism x Con- Shortest Significant
ditions A B C D E F G H I Ranges for p .05
Means 34.67 36.00 36.66 36.66 36.66 37.33 43.00 44.00 51.3^
A N Hi 34.67 1.33 1.99 1.99 1.99 2.66 8.33 9.33 16.66 R2=10.68
B N Lo 36.00 .66 .66 .66 1.33 7.00 8.00 15.33 R3=11.23
C NF Lo 36.66 .67 6.34 7.34 14.67 R.=11.60 4
D FB Hi 36.66 .67 6.34 7.34 14.67 R3=11.68
E NF M 36.66 .67 6.34 7.34 14.67 Rg=12.07
F NF M 37.33 5.67 6.67 14.00 R?=12.23
G N Hi 43.00 1.00 8.33 Rg=12.37
H FB M 44.00 7.33 Rg=12.48
I FB 51.33
A B
■I1
C D E F G H I
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APPENDIX C
TABLE I
Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x Conditions x
Dogmatism x Segments for Confidence
Case Condition M
SD SD X SD
Low Dogmatism 
Med. Dogmatism
Low Dogmatism
High Dogmatism
Low Dogmatism
GA 46.800 24.713 48.800 24.817 50.800 26.075
Me 37.200 17.636 47.600 23.180 52.400 25.186
Gel 46.600 24.338 45.200 23.436 46.200 22.843
Me 38.800 18.971 48.400 23.477 50.400 24.460
Ga 38.000 18.614 36.400 17.745 39.200 19.864
Me 40.400 19.615 46.400 22.156 50.400 24.141
IJigh Dogmatism
Condition NF
Ga 40.800 20.280 41.200 19.944 43.200 20.889
Me 32.800 15.524 36.800 17.525 44.400 21.747
Ge 46.400 25.335 46.800 24.767 42.800 21.414
Me 40.000 18.954 46.800 22.285 50.000 24.272
Ga 37.600 17.999 38.800 18.971 41.600 19.791
Me 52.200 21.711 48.800 24.850 56.000 28.933
Condition FB
Gel 54.400 26.356 52.80Q 25.384 58.400 28.922
Me’ 48.800 23.719 52.000 24.901 55.200 27.150
Ga 48.400- 24.127 61.200 30.890 54.800 29.210
Me 39.60Q 19.387 38.000 18.252 38.000 18.105
Ga 42.800 20.859 41.600 20.636 48.800 23.752
Me 50.400 v 25.063 56.000 28.167 58.400 28.080 123
TABLE II
Low Dogmatism 
Med. Dogmatism 
High Dogmatism
Low Dogmatism 
High Dogmatism 
High Dogmatism
Low Dogmatism 
Med. Dogmatism
High Dogmatism
Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x Conditions x
Dogmatism x Segments for Appropriateness
-ase
x S1 SD
Condition N
S2X SD
;
X
S3
J SD
Ga 37.640 20.278 35.520 18.120 43.600 21.372
Me 30.760 14.919 30.080 16.453 34.800 19.420
Ga 41.920 23.199 28.740 14.315 23.520 11.818
Me 32.280 16.972 35.640 18.353 34.440 16.555
Ga 23.600 12.010 20.440 10.850 15.320 9.048
Me 30.000 15.187 32.880 16.625 23.240 14.528
Ga 26.840 14.503
Condition NF 
33.160 17.851 30.360 17.182
Me 24.040 12.530 23.000 12.236 29.200 16.778
Ga 32.200 20.576 33.280 17.407 28.240 15.447
Me 37.640 18.345 30.080 14.783 31.680 16.164
Ga 33.640 17.841 27.520 14.674 32.680 15.656
Me 41.200 19.539 36.040 18.649 42.440 21.175
Ga 44.040 23.403
Condition FB 
29.560 18.914 36.720 18.522
Me 38.440 19.083 30.480 16.402 24.720 13.996
Ga 29.920 15.896 33.200 18.169 27.560 17.101
Me 29.920 12.844 33.120 17.545 25.920 14.126
Ga 26.760 15.412 35.880 18.316 41.520 20.875
Me 35.240 18.029 40.040 21.986 44.840 23.277 H
N5
TABLE III
Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x Conditions x
Dogmatism x Segments for Accuracy
Low Dogmatism
Case
Ga
S1X
28.000
SD
16.110
Condition N
S2X
36.000
SD
19.043
S3X 6 
68.000
SD
32.550
Me 12.000 8.000 40.000 20.221 32.000 17.688
Med. Dogmatism Go. 29.000 20.693 48.340 25.618 64.660 30.809
Me 20.000 15.776 64.000 33.038 32.000 16.110
High Dogmatism Ga 28.000 19.136 36.000 19.043 56.000 27.776
Me 24.000 14.236 28.000 16.110 36.100 19.043
Low Dogmatism Ga 24.000 14.236
Condition NF 
56.000 27.776 64.000 32.221
Me 12.000 10.832 40.000 22.705 24.000 14.236
Med. Dogmatism Ga 44.000 23.626 36.000 19.043 60.000 30.110Me 8.000 6.798 48.000 23.323 28.000 16.110
High Dogmatism Ga 28.000 16.110 48.000 25.508 64.000 31.382Me 4.000 4.988 40.000 20.221 36.000 20.396
Low Dogmatism Ga 20.000 13.984
Condition FB 
28.000 17.688 60.000 32.659
Me 24.000 12.220 32.000 16.110 56.000 31.382
Med. Dogmatism Ga 48.000 24.440 52.000 30.868 76.000 38.273
Me 36.000 21.664 56.000 27.776 40.000 24.944
High Dogmatism Ga 36.000 21.664 52.000 28.158 76.000 36.854Me 24.000 16.000 40.000 24.944 36.000 20.396
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TABLE IV
Appropriateness Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x
Conditions x Confidence x Segments
Case Condition N
x Sl SD S2X z SD S3X J SD
Low Confidence Ga 26.000 12.578 18.800 9.956 25.600 14.813Me 25.440 12.562 34.440 18.023 20.000 11.211
Med Confidence Ga 29.480 15.374 28.700 14.124 29.960 16.770X X W  • Me 28.800 13.984 31.320 16.761 27.240 14.577
High Confidence Ga 47.680 26.256 37.200 18.607 26.880 14.952Me 38.800 19.430 32.840 16.714 45.240 22.276
Condition NF
Low Confidence Ga 20.040 12.087 29.920 15.636 25.880 14.720
■ Me 31.640 15.692 25.080 14.303 27.640 15.566
Med. Confidence
Ga
Me
36.440
38.800
18.167
18.645
31.600
28.440
18.360
13.711
34.320
30.400
18.301
15.957
High Confidence Ga 39.200 21.364 32.440 16.046 31.080 14.980Me 32.440 17.211 35.600 18.070 45.280 22.028
Condition FB
Low Confidence Ga
Me
16.360
25.600
8.543
12.742
35.440
28.320
18.515
15.433
31.880
23.200
17.244
14.214
Med.
i
Confidence Ga
Me
50.040
31.960
24.416
16.749
33.680
28.040
18.493
14.204
44.320
32.360
21.975
17.493
High Confidence Ga 34.320 18.031 29.520 18.403 29.600 16.977Me 42.040 20.356 47.280 24.468 39.920 21.022 126
TABLE V
fi
Low Confidence 
Med. Confidence 
High Confidence
Low Confidence 
Med. Confidence 
pigh Confidence
Low Confidence
i
Med. Confidence 
High Confidence
Accuracy Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x
Conditions x Confidence x Segments
Case Condition N
X SD 2X z SD 3X SD
Ga 20.000 15.776 40.000 20.221 56.000 27.776
Me 20.000 15.776 36.000 20.396 36.000 19.043
Gs 45.000 24.832 36.340 19.214 60.660 28.605
Me 20.000 11.925 56.000 31.382 40.000 20.221
Ga 20.000 11.925 44.000 24.729 72.000 34.409
Me 16.000 11.469 40.000 20.221 24.000 12.220
Condition NF
Ga 40.000 20.211 52.000 27.194 60.000 30.110
Me 4.000 4.988 44.000 24.729 32.000 16.110
Ga 24.000 17.587 52.000 27.194 68.000 34.150
Me 4.000 4.988 48.000 23.323 24.000 16.000
Ga 32.000 17.688 36.000 17.587 60.000 29.211
Me 16.000 11.469 36.000 17.587 32.000 19.136
Condition FB
Ga 36.000 20.396 48.000 27.519 68.000 34.150
Me 28.000 17.688 48.000 25.508 36.000 22.861
Ga 20.000 13.984 24.000 14.236 68.000 37.142
Me 28.000 17.688 56.000 27.776 36.000 20.396
Ga 48.000 25.508 60.000 32.659 76.000 36.854
Me 28.000 16.110 24.000 14.236 60.000 32.659
TABLE VI
Confidence Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x
Conditions x Appropriateness x Segments
Case Condition N
Med. Appropriateness 
Low Appropriateness
High Appropriateness
High Appropriateness 
Med. Appropriateness 
Low Appropriateness
1
X SD x 2 SD ■3X SD
Gs. 31.600 15.010 33.600 16.244 33.200 15.964
Me 36.800 17.387 46.000 22.267 47.600 23.030
Ga 43.000 20.789 38.400 18.428 45.000 22.172
Me 37.600 18.510 43.200 20.437 48.800 23.207
Ga 56.800 29.365 58.400 29.106 58.000 28.693
Me 42.000 20.238 53.200 25.694 56.800 27.226
Ga 37.200
Condition
17.696
NP
38.400 18.356 40.400 19.639
Me 33.600 15.879 39.600 19.166 41.200 20.131
Ga 38.800 19.512 38.400 18.758 41.600 20.112
Me 38.400 18.298 38.800 18.473 46.800 22.511
Ga 48.800 26.075 50.000 26.001 45.600 22.483
Me 46.000 22.014 54.000 26.563 62.400 31.110
Ga 38.400
Condition
18.472
FB
49.600 26.193 53.200 28.017
Me 46.800 23.107 46.800 22.392 49.200 24.057
Ga 48.400 23.590 49.200 23.722 54.800 27.479
Me 40.800 19.516 40.000 19.164 43.200 20.940
Ga 58.800 28.257 56.800 28.160 54.000 26.812
Me 51.200 25.559 59.200 29.609 59.200 29.128
TABLE VII
High
Med.
Low
High
Med.
Low
High
Med.
Low
Accuracy Means and Standard Deviations for Tests x
 ^ Conditions x Appropriateness x Segments
Case Condition N
Appropriateness
Appropriateness
Appropriateness
Appropriateness
Appropriateness
Appropriateness
Appropriateness 
Appropriatenes s 
Appropriatenes s
1 2 3X SD X SD X SD
Gs. 16.000 11.469 36,000 19.043 60.000 29.211
Me 32.000 17.688 48.000 25.508 40.000 20.221
Ga 45.000 24.832 40.340 22.842 60.660 29.523
Me 12.000 10.832 36.000 25.086 28.000 14.360
Ga 24.000 16.000 44.000 22.469 68.000 32.550
Me 12.000 8.000 48.000 23 .323 32.000 17.688
Condition NF
Ga 36.000 .21.664 • 40.000 22.705 56.000 27.776
Me 12.000 10.832 44.000 24.729 24.000 14.236
Ga 24.000 14.236 48.000 24.440 •72.000 35.925
Me 4.000 4.988 48.000 23.323 28.000 16.110
Ga 36.000 19.043 52.000 26.195 60.000 29.211
Me 8.000 6.978 36.000 17.587 36.000 20.396
Condition FB
Ga 32.000 22.939 44.000 26.799 80.000 39.101
Me 32.000 17.688 52.000 27.194 56.000 30.521
Ga 40.000 20.221 56.000 29.634 52.000 27.194
Me 28.000 17.688 52.000 26.195 20.000 11.925
Ga 32.000 19.136 32.000 21.746 80.000 39.777
Me 24.000 16.000 24.000 14.236 56.000 29.634 co
TABLE VIII
Confidence Means and 
Conditions
Standard Deviations for Tests x 
x Accuracy x Segments
Low Accuracy
Case
[
Gel
S
X
42.400
Condition
1 SD
23.386
N
S2x z 
40.800
SD
21.080
x 83 
39.600
SD
20.196
Me 38.800 31.044 47.600 17.227 51.200 21.181
Med„ Accuracy G& 47.000 24.302 50.400 26.248 50.200 20.196
Me 41.200 18.985 51.600 22.890 54.400 24.569
High Accuracy \ Ga 42.000 20.396 39.200 18.645 46.400 25.903
Me 36.400 19.944 43.200 24.557 47.600 25.865
Low Accuracy Ga 53.600
Condition
22.773
NF
53.600 17.080 47.200 17.711
Me 38.400 23.248 37.600 18.530 43.200 22.316
Med. Accuracy Ga 35.200 28.052 36.000 27.271 40.800 23.390
Me 40.800 18.327 49.200 " 17.999 59.200 20;966
High Accuracy Ga 36.000 16.731 37.200 17.204 39.600 19.544
Me 38.800 20.015 45.600 24.507 48.000 29.228
Low Accuracy Ga 50.800
Condition
18.815
FB
48.400 23.793 49.200 29.869
Me 50.400 24.451 50.400 26.166 51.200 25.559
Med. Accuracy Ga' 46.400 25.370 49.600 23.658 52.800 24.518
Me 42.800 25.089 52.000 24.901 53.200 25.972
High Accuracy GA 48.400 22.550 57.600 24.259 60.000 26.221
Me 45.600 22.754 43.600 21.384 47.200 23.459 130
TABLE IX
Appropriateness Means and Standard Deviations for Tests
x Conditions x Accuracy x Segments
Case Condition N
Low Accuracy Ga
Me
S1X
31.640
35.560
SD
17.979
18.201
s2
X
23.640
30.880
SD
12.052
15.293
x 33
29.240 
32 .000
SD
17.882
19.441
Med. Accuracy GaMe
42.280
27.560
23.390
13.433
29.980  ^
24.480
16.548
12.742
23.600
33.640
11.853
16.737
High Accuracy GaMe
29.240
29.920
15.264
15.038
31.080
43.240
15.524
21.661
29.600
26.840
16.203
14.527
Condition NF
Low Accuracy Ga
Me
40.000
30.480
21.892
15.413
30.520
21.600
16.213
11.200
23.920
31.240
12.821
16.836
Med. Accuracy GaMe
29.600
32.000
16.337
16.535
32.760
31.560
18.178
17.088
40.120
44.040
14.078
22.218
High Accuracy GaMe
26.080
40.400
14.093
19.397
56.000
35.960
15.677
17.206
80.000
28.040
20.031
14.462
Condition FB
Low Accuracy Ga
Me
41.240
33.640
22.723
17.564
38.680
28.840
19.537
17.785
25.880
38.440
13.191
22.425
Med. Accuracy GaMe
33.600
34.840
18.457
17.638
21.560
38.440
14.130
20,255
46.320
32.320
22.500
16.370
High Accuracy GaMe
25.880
31.120
13.660
15.595
38.400
36.360
20.562
18.260
33.600
24.720
19.456
13.570 131
VITA
Harold P. Weingold was born in Newark., New Jersey, 
on March 23, 1933. He is the third child of Anna and 
Samuel P. Weingold. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree 
in Psychology from Rutgers University in June, 1960. In 
June, 1963, he received his Master, of Arts degree in Psy­
chology from Louisiana State University. He completed the 
requirements for the Ph.D. at that institution in May, 1968.
Candidate: 
Major Field: 
Title of Thesis:
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Harold P . Weingold 
Psychology
Cognitive Style and Judgmental Accuracy
Approved:
Major Professor and Chairman 
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Date of Examination:
23 April 1968
